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Abstract
This thesis of creative practice research presents a collection of texts arising from two intersecting themes of enquiry
in the field of creative writing. It investigates experimental modes of creative nonfiction that break with the
convention of longform narrative, and asks how these experimental affordances might be used to write an anxious
self, fragmented by various illness states. Emboldened by a movement of experimental nonfiction declared by
Shields’ (2010) Reality Hunger: a manifesto, poetic fragmentation, lyric association, photomontage, erasure, and
portraiture are used to write this ill self and its accompanying provocations to reality, identity, and selfhood. An
autobiographical subject is encountered that is “fragmented, provisional, multiple, in process” (Smith & Watson
2002, p. 9) with a particular interest paid to the tension between spatial and temporal modes of self-representation at
the autobiographical interface of text and image. These questions form the reflexive ground for a critical enquiry
into the categorical slipperiness of nonfiction in theory and practice, addressed in the project’s research
methodology. This methodology brings together all texts in an “expanded field” of nonfiction adapting Krauss’s
(1979) critical framework first developed to account for changes in the logic of practice in postmodern sculpture. In
the expanded field of nonfiction, it is the position taken in relation to the field’s structuring opposition fiction/fact
that is the new logic of practice. A diversity of forms and writing approaches can be mapped in this field without
collapsing its essential foundational oppositions. Foregrounding the imbrication of the essay in the French tradition
of “a thinking” that occurs “through the material fabrication of language” (Duplessis 1996, p. 19) and qualitative
research methods of writing as “a mode of enquiry in its own right” (Gibbs 2007 p. 222), the divide between
‘creative’ and ‘critical’ modes of writing in academic research is surmounted, opening the way for a playful
exploration of flexible knowledge forms through expanded writing practice.
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Introduction
Reality Hunger: experimenting with nonfiction
An artistic movement, albeit an organic and as-yet-unstated one, is forming. What are its key components?
A deliberate unartiness: ‘raw’ material, seemingly unprocessed, unfiltered, uncensored, and unprofessional.
(What, in the last half century, has been more influential than Abraham Zapruder’s Super-8 film of the
Kennedy assassination?) Randomness, openness to accident and serendipity, spontaneity; artistic risk,
emotional urgency and intensity, reader/viewer participation; an overly literal tone, as if a reporter were
viewing a strange culture; plasticity of form, pointillism; criticism as autobiography; self-reflexivity, selfethnography, anthropological autobiography; a blurring (to the point of invisibility) of any distinction
between fiction and nonfiction: the lure and blur of the real.
(Shields 2010, p. 5)
David Shields’s Reality Hunger: A Manifesto calls for writers to participate in an experimental literature that
troubles the boundaries of genre, medium and artistic categories. The book’s stated intent to be an “ars poetica for a
burgeoning group of interrelated but unconnected artists” (p. 3) was welcomed warmly by those wanting to think
differently about writing and literature. Critics called Reality Hunger “raw and gorgeous” (Salter Reynolds 2010),
finding that it “urgently and succinctly addresses matters that have been in the air” (Sante 2010). For Singer and
Walker (2013b, p. 1) Reality Hunger “throws down the gauntlet”, challenging writers of creative nonfiction to reach
beyond the conventions of narrative realism to explore new ways of writing twenty-first century realities. This kind
of experimental nonfiction is “the preeminent expression of the blurry reality of our times”.
I was one of the writers to whom Reality Hunger spoke powerfully. Coming as I have, to writing through
journalism, media and arts criticism, I am a voracious reader, interpreter, participant of practices that occur “in the
seam between sociality and textuality” (Duplessis 1996, p. 23). This is the domain of nonfiction, but I had not

previously considered it a territory for creative writing practice. Reality Hunger gave me permission to think about
writing in a much broader, more conceptual, more experimental way.
As a work gets more autobiographical, more intimate, more confessional, more embarrassing, it breaks into
fragments. Our lives aren’t prepackaged along narrative lines and, therefore, by its very nature, realitybased art—underprocessed, underproduced—splinters and explodes.
(Shields 2010, p. 27)
Reality Hunger is, however, a provocation, not an explanation. It raises ideas and hunches that a lot of writers like
me can relate to, but it does not provide any critical ground for explaining them. While it was a creative inspiration,
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Reality Hunger was also a tangle. An unofficial research question of this project has been wtf is Shields actually
taking about?
On this and other questions during this research, the visual and the spatial seemed always to turn the key. As a
writer I have always been very engaged with contemporary art. From the late 1990s I wrote features, profiles and
reviews for The Age, the ABC and other media mastheads, and essays for journals and exhibition catalogues. This
doctoral research has become the foundation for a writing program I currently lead at the Australian Centre for
Contemporary Art called Writing in the Expanded Field. Reality Hunger’s call for writers to experiment and move
between genres and mediums immediately reminded me of the fluidity of contemporary art practice, that is “no
longer directed exclusively towards a set of formal or genre conventions, but to a wider set of cultural terms and
relations” (Delany 2013, n.p.). As I was beginning this research, the National Gallery of Victoria held a survey
exhibition of contemporary art and design called Melbourne Now. Wandering through this show, and its “giddying,
heterogeneous and sometimes bewildering array of media, actions, events and conceptual maneuvers” (Delany 2013,
n, I started to think about current experimental moves in literary nonfiction through the lens of Rosalind Krauss’s
(1979, pp. 41–42) notion of the “expanded field” of practice. Krauss’s famous and important essay ‘Sculpture in the
Expanded Field’, first published in the journal October, articulated a “transformation of the cultural field” in which
sculpture was no longer defined in terms of a given medium but rather “in relation to the logical operations on a set
of cultural terms”. By bringing Krauss’s method of expansion to the field of nonfiction, I found the critical structure
to support the experimentation and play called for by Reality Hunger. Developing this methodology, I was able to
think past fixed forms and genres of nonfiction, and into an expanded field of writing that is radically fluid, but
logically structured by the opposition fiction/fact.

Writing the ill self
In the chronology of this research, my urge to experiment with writing nonfiction collided with two serious episodes
of illness (or perhaps one very long one that I was thrown back into just when I was through the worst). This ill self
became the site for my nonfiction enquiries. My illness was another episode in a chronic anxiety and panic disorder
with which I have lived all my adult life. Since early adulthood I have experienced acute anxiety and panic, nervous
exhaustion and severe depression. I have spent months at a time in convalescence and years in psychotherapy, I have
spent thousands of dollars on wellness, swallowed multitudes of medicines and tried all sort of therapies—and then
it got worse. Many things at once, and none in particular, seemed to be the problem this time. There was grief at my
father’s sudden death from cancer, colliding with my troubled relationship with my mother, colliding with a creeping
and profound existential awareness, and difficult choices around work and relationships as I pushed into my thirties.
Just as I was getting better, one year after commencing this doctoral research, I had a bike accident in which I was
concussed. This head injury drove me back into acute illness that took another two years to recover from. This time
it was particularly difficult (but particularly interesting in retrospect) because I could not engage with the usual
cognitive therapeutic strategies because my brain was injured. I had to process my recovery physically, through my
body.
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Illness changes our reality. As Virginia Woolf famously wondered in On Being Ill (2012, p. 3), “how astonishing,
when the lights of health go down, the undiscovered countries that are then disclosed”. Anxiety and depression
confront a foundational notion of my own reality, that is the notion of a unified, constant and reliable self. During
the course of this research, as I moved through different states of being ill and being well, being incapacitated, being
wretched with misery and being lucid, I necessarily had to take different writing approaches. Different states of
illness lent themselves to more and less access to the self. It was sometimes too painful to write, sometimes
impossible to write in words, and sometimes the perfect springboard into experimental approaches. The
fragmentation and instability within me lent itself to an encounter with the autobiographical subject that was
“fragmented, provisional, multiple, in process” (Smith & Watson 2002, p. 9). I was drawn to the fragment, the lyric,
the essayistic and what Smith and Watson refer to as the autobiographical “interface” between text and image, and
the tension that Broughton (2006, p. 4) finds within autobiography “between narrative (chronological sequence and
the course of a life over time as modes of explanation) and portrait (elaborations of the self writing in the present)”.
For the self and identity in performative flux that I have written in this research, I use the term ‘illness’ instead of
‘disability’. While this project and its thinking through of chronic illness has led me to identify with and assert a
disability identity in other contexts of my life, I have kept it adjacent here. Couser (2011, p. 232) finds that disability
is not located in the body or the self, but rather is “the added penalty that societies impose on those whose bodies are
significantly atypical”, through “social, cultural, legal, and architectural obstacles”. In this way, writing disability
often involves the examination of these politics and a “movement toward a positive disability identity”. My
movement toward this identity certainly has occurred as a result of this work, but it is not a key part of my enquiries
here.

Writing as research in the expanded field of nonfiction
In her instructive paper on ‘Life Writing as Critical Creative Practice’ (2011, p. 887), Margaretta Jolly calls it “a
mutable genre that can be at once critical practice, practice-based research and creative experiment”. The tangle of
nonfiction practices I found in Reality Hunger only got bigger and more complex when critical-creative research and
writing approaches were added to the mix. Methodologies of “writing as research” (Gibbs 2007, p. 222) consider
writing as “a mode of enquiry in its own right”, something that is “continuous with” and “in large part, produces”
knowledge, rather than simply being a neutral container for it. Scholarly writing, as with all “textual staging”
(Richardson & Adams St Pierre 2000, p. 960) is not neutral, it is “like all other forms of writing, a sociohistorical
construction, and is therefore, mutable”. Writing as research takes as a departure point the idea that “writing,
method, methodology, epistemology, ethics and politics are inextricably linked” (Lykke et al. 2014, p. 3), requiring
the researcher to locate themselves within these intersecting relations, and “passionate engagements” (Gibbs 2007,
p. 223) with research subjects and research questions. In this way, methods of writing as research transgress the
conventional scholarly divide between creative and critical writing often characterised by the use of a ‘neutral’
scholarly voice in ‘theory’ sections and the neat sectioning off of writing considered to be ‘creative’. This project
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does not seek to separate creative practice writing as research into creative and critical halves. Rather, it presents all
texts as research, locating them within an ‘expanded field of nonfiction’ that is articulated in this thesis’
methodology section.

Summary of the main project texts
This thesis collects five works of expanded autobiography, and four accompanying essays addressing a critical
problem encountered. Each of these texts is discrete, and while the problems and perspectives overlap, they can be
read as stand-alone pieces connected by the research methodology ‘essaying in the expanded field of nonfiction’.
This thesis is non-linear, and best read like a folio, or a magazine (or perhaps a ‘zine’ considering the low-fi
approach I had to adopt toward some of the expanded texts). I necessarily used a very DIY ‘bedroom approach’ in
my writing experiments; I am not a designer or a trained artist, I do not know the Adobe suite and do not have any
advanced skills in image making. I have taken inspiration from Shields’s call-out (above) to ‘rawness’ and the
“seemingly unprocessed, unfiltered, uncensored, and unprofessional”, and the kinds of aesthetics Sontag (1993, p.
xiv) called “the modern stylistics of refusal”. Early modern Dadaism, 70s punk and 90s grunge art have all been
influential. Needing a creative model that accounted for my amateur skills and also gave me the courage to try
things I had not done before, I would think of Viv Albertine (guitarist from 70s punk band The Slits) learning guitar
“from scratch” by twiddling knobs on her amp to “recreate the sounds of animals and other noises” (Albertine 2014,
p. 134). I have deliberately and necessarily only used analogue methods—scissors and glue and photocopiers and
smartphone photos, and basic software functions like screenshots and fiddling around with the formatting of
Microsoft Word.
The Club: a redacted history is a work of “discursive autobiography” (Cappello 2013, p. 70) that uses the
technique of erasure to rewrite toxic discourses of femininity embedded within my family history. Using a black-out
method of “complete” erasure (Cooney 2014, p. 18), this work appropriates words and images from the history of a
private ladies’ club in Melbourne of which my mother is a member, subverting the discourses of stifled,
domesticated femininity to which it still holds fast.
The cut, the page, the palimpsest: rewriting toxic femininity critically addresses the problem of placing my
mother and my maternal family history within my autobiographical enquiry. This is a history that is so important to
my illness story but also toxic and difficult. This essay articulates the process of finding a way of working with it by
locating the page as a ‘critical surface’ upon which histories and mythologies might be rethought and rewritten.
Considering the absurd and angry photomontages of modern artist Hannah Höch, which interrupt discourses of
femininity through cutting into the page, and the ‘poetic erasures’ of contemporary poet Mary Ruefle, which write
by using correction fluid on the page, I find a way to work with a painful history.
Notes from sick rooms is a work of “palimpsestic” poetic erasure (Cooney 2014, p. 18) and photomontage that can
also be read as a discursive autobiography. Words are taken from a Victorian nursing manual published in 1887 by
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Julia Stephen, and images are copied and cut from histories of nineteenth and early twentieth century Australia. This
piece uses the materiality of language, image and the page to rewrite discourses of femininity and illness that are
part of my family biography. It locates these discourses in colonial Australia through appropriated historical
imagery, connecting them with broader Western cultural myths of the ‘mad woman in the attic’ (Gilbert & Gubar
1979). An additional layer of meaning and reference to literary tropes is tacit in the piece through the nursing
manual’s original author, Julia Stephen, who was Virginia Woolf’s mother.
Writing the unthinkable: anxiety, the lyric essay and poetic language addresses the problem of writing about an
experience of anxiety that is psychically “unthinkable” (Winnicott 1974, p. 88). Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, I
consider my anxiety as a symptom of pre-verbal trauma, something that comes in feelings and sensations rather than
words. Julia Kristeva’s (1984, p. 86) notion of poetic language and the semiotic register of the “genotext” is raised
as a way to access and write this kind of anxiety. Claudia Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely (2017) and Eula Biss’s
‘The Pain Scale’ (2007) are considered in these terms, with further discussion of their relevance for recent
definitions of the ‘lyric essay’.
So that I might know anxiety is a lyric essay that circles anxiety and reflects on an existential confrontation with
the self that it brings about. Using a poetic logic that uses space, line, gaps and pauses, image and white space, this
piece deliberately circles around and avoids a narrative that might explain the anxiety or resolve it. The
autobiographical narrator works through experiences in fragments as the essay progresses considering existential
notions of anxiety and spirit and the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. Image and text are layered “relationally” so
that “each elucidates the other, but is not reducible to it” (Smith & Watson 2002, p. 25).
Quests and chaos: from illness memoir to existential essaying critically addresses the problem of writing an
experience of illness that does not follow a conventional narrative trajectory from the misfortune of illness to the
triumph of health. Through textual analysis of F Scott Fitzgerald’s 1939 essay ‘The Crack-Up’ and Joan Didion’s
1979 essay ‘The White Album’, the essay form is considered for writing what Frank (1995, p. 98) calls “chaos
narratives” of illness, that are chronic, or episodic and which do not neatly resolve in recovery and success. Klaus’s
(2010, p. 131) term “existential essay” is drawn on to update the essay’s masculinist traditions, and provide a further
model for writing a fragmented and chaotic experience of illness in which recovery does not necessarily equal
narrative resolution.
Hopeless romantic: performing metaphors of illness critically addresses the problem of the autobiographical
writer’s entanglement with punitive, glorifying and sentimental metaphors of illness embedded in cultural
discourses. Drawing on Susan Sontag’s essay ‘Illness as Metaphor’ (2009b), this essay examines the
‘characterological’ metaphors of illness that the ill person inhabits as part of surviving, coping and finding one’s way
through illness and personal crisis. The notion of the performative self is raised as a way of inhabiting these
discursive metaphors as part of illness writing, while simultaneously holding them at a critical distance.
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You will come to know your body is an essay of fragments based on dialogues with a boxing trainer, written during
my recovery from a mild traumatic brain injury. In between these dialogues, thoughts circle around injury, pain,
what it means to feel and to be hurt. These two threads bounce back and forth like boxers, reflecting on the
embodied self, flesh and psychoanalytic ideas of embodied consciousness.
Heavyweight is a self-portrait series overlaid with text that accounts a heavyweight title fight I saw in Brooklyn
New York. The metaphor of illness as a fight, and the fight as a struggle for voice, is literally written on the body
here. The fleshy paleness of my skin, becomes the page. The text/image interface is temporally contracted or
“telescoped” (Smith & Watson 2002, p. 21) in the spatial plane of the portrait. The images in this work were made
spontaneously one day, with my good friend and photographer Tina Inserra. We decided to take a series of photos
while I maintained the same posture, meditating with my eyes open in front of an open window for 20 minutes.
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Research methodology: essaying in the expanded field of nonfiction
Research methodology, or research design, enables the research “to achieve what it sets out to do” (Sempert et al.
2017, p. 206). In academic fields such as science, this process is often fixed and straightforward, but in creative
practice research “methodologies can adapt and … are often responsive and reflexive”, methodological design here
involves “negotiating the sticky yet rich relationship between theory and practice”. In the field of creative writing,
this is often bluntly understood as designating what part of a thesis is going to be ‘creative’ (practice) and ‘critical’
(theory). But as Watkins and Krauth (2016, n.p.) suggest, creative writing research is “in the box seat” for
“exploring and exploiting new, flexible and dynamic knowledge forms” that respond to a need to explore diverse
ways of knowing and responding. For Webb (2012, pp. 13–14) the creative researcher is in a unique position to
innovate by taking a reflexive approach to both theory and practice. Being “a fish at least partially out of water” in
both academic and artistic fields, the creative researcher has the critical leverage to approach both kinds of
knowledge at a distance. This gives them the opportunity to “change the terms of engagement and the relational
principles that direct their activity” in both modes. Creative research can in this way “result in something genuinely
new: a new kind of academic who is simultaneously a new kind of artist, making a new kind of object in a
reconceptualised field”. The following methodological design provides a framework for such an enquiry.
Krauss’s (1979) method of expanding the field of sculpture is here adapted for nonfiction writing practice. Krauss’s
concept and critical method has resonance for the field of nonfiction as this already nebulous literary category
grows to include poetic and diverse “reality-based” (Shields 2010, p.27) writing experiments, alongside its
traditions in narrative journalism and the literary essay. Expanding the field following Krauss provides a critical
structure for a diversity of nonfiction writing practice, within which, we can also locate qualitative methods of
“writing as research” (Gibbs 2007, p.222) that bridge the divide between creative and critical modes of academic
writing.

Nonfiction now
In their “(non)introduction” to TEXT journal’s Special Issue 18: Nonfiction Now, Carlin & Rendle Short (2013, p. 2)
make a claim for “embracing the simple nonhyphenated term ‘nonfiction’” to designate “a broad territory of creative
practice”. This broad field can be seen to have grown in the past two decades or so, from its most recognisable form
as narrative journalism, personal essaying and memoir, to include a great flourishing of the form “we might as well
call” (D’Agata 2014) the lyric essay, forays into ‘nonfiction poetry’ (Wilkinson and Alizadeh 2012) as well as
Shields’s (2010) previously mentioned encounters with “reality-based art”. The contemporary field also
encompasses a great interest in the essay in its Montaignean tradition being “the mind at work on the page” (Klauss
2012, p. xiii), as well as the epigrammatic “paraliterary” (Krauss 1980) book-length essay made most famous by
Roland Barthes. Nonfiction’s vanguard is concerned with inventing new ways “in which the raw material of ‘reality’
is transformed into literary art” (Singer & Walker 2013b, p. 2). Unsurprisingly, in this growing field with traditions
in journalism, that now takes in poetics and literary experiments, we find many unresolved questions over exactly
what nonfiction is, and how it can be critically defined. In these debates, the opposition: fact/fiction persists despite
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the “praxical and theoretical fraying of its boundaries” (Carlin and Rendle-Short 2013, p.2) in late twentieth century
critical discourse.
There are some nonfiction writers such as Lee Gutkind (no date), founder of the literary magazine Creative
Nonfiction, for whom ‘nonfiction’ is “honest and straight forward”, defined simply as “factually accurate prose
about real people and events” with no place for imagination and poetics: “The cardinal rule is clear—and cannot be
violated. This is the pledge the writer makes to the reader … You can’t make this stuff up!”. In vehement
disagreement with Gutkind, is John D’Agata—a classicist as well as a contemporary writer, who points to the
traditions of the essay that have engaged with ideas of self, reality and experience in a different way to journalism.
D’Agata points to the tradition of “woefully unverifiable” (2015, p. 8) essays from Cicero through Montaigne to
Virginia Woolf, Natalia Ginzberg and Sebald, insisting that a definition of nonfiction ruling out this tradition is too
great a loss. For D’Agata the “most truthful struggles with reality exist … between those poles of what is verifiable
and what’s simply not”. The Lifespan of a Fact (D’Agata & Fingal 2012) performs this debate as a dramatised
transcript of an actual dispute between D’Agata and a fact-checker Jim Fingal. Their disagreement concerns the
verifiable facts of a longform piece about a young man’s suicide in Las Vegas that D’Agata had witten for The
Believer magazine. As the book continues, D’Agata and Fingal argue on the page over large and small factual details
of the story, some of which D’Agata admits have been altered to suit the writer’s preferences for image, rhythm and
metaphor. The book is a provocation that calls attention to the sometimes absurd, sometimes impossible practice of
verifying all the details a writer has chosen to tell a ‘realistic’ story. On this point, Shields (2010, p. 40) also urges
writers to look to the essay’s traditions of philosophical enquiry to turn “the banality” of nonfiction “inside out”. If
we stop obsessive fact-checking about the colour of someone’s jumper, we find “an extremely rich theatre for
investigating the most serious epistemological questions”. Critical debate in the field has been somewhat prone to
polarisation by the seemingly insurmountable differences between a nonfiction committed to journalistic practices of
verification, and a nonfiction that takes theoretical and philosophical problematising of ‘truth’ as a point of
departure.
But what can an art critic’s 1979 essay on sculpture bring to these twenty-first questions about nonfiction writing?
Krauss’s essay Sculpture in the Expanded Field laid the critical groundwork for thinking about sculptural form and
practice in a completely new way. Born from a need to more precisely locate emergent sculptural forms within art
discourse of the 1960s, Krauss showed that sculptural practice should no longer be understood primarily through the
Art Historical discourse of medium and material. Instead, it was organising around enquiries into “the universe of
terms that are felt to be in opposition in a cultural situation” (p. 43). Krauss points to the transferability of this
method of expansion for other artistic practices, but at a 2007 symposium celebrating her ground-breaking work, she
reiterated the importance of the foundational opposition: “When you do something like these fields, the fundamental
binary has to be right or the whole thing is just gibberish” (Krauss et al 2014, p.14). By bringing Krauss’s method to
bear on the ongoing tension around the opposition fact/fiction, we are able to expand the field of nonfiction and
critically locate a diversity of nonfiction writing practices and approaches.
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The expanded field: structuring “this motley of effort”
In her 1979 essay, Krauss (p. 31) notes that “over the last ten years rather surprising things have come to be called
sculpture”. She points to architectural structures such as long “narrow corridors with TV monitors at the ends”,
“large photographs documenting country hikes” and “lines cut into the floor of the desert” or “a delicate structure of
posts and beams” set into the ground. At the beginning of the essay, Krauss takes the reader to the edge of Mary
Miss’s 1978 earthwork Perimeters/Pavilions/Decoys, a deep, square pit cut into the ground structured with posts and
beams. And so, she says “we stare at the pit in the earth, and think we both do and don’t know what sculpture is”.
Her point is, that all manner of multiplying forms and structures were being produced at this moment in the name of
sculpture. But “nothing”, Krauss writes with something close to exasperation, “could possibly give to such a motley
of effort the right to lay claim to whatever one might mean by the category of sculpture” unless “the category can be
made to become almost infinitely malleable”.
Krauss (1979, pp. 33–34) proposed that it was actually very clear what sculpture is, if traced to its historical
conventions. Through historical analysis, Krauss showed that the logic of sculpture in Western art was inseparable
from its role as a civic monument: “a commemorative representation” located in “a particular place and speak[ing]
in a symbolical tongue about the meaning or use of that place”. Pointing to the civic statues that appear commonly in
Western cities, Krauss cites the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius in the Campidoglio in Rome as a particular
example. She then points to Rodin’s early twentieth century works Gates of Hell and his statue of Balzac as
examples of failed monuments, which mark the move into sculpture’s modernist phase. In modernism, sculpture
becomes “the monument as abstraction, the monument as pure marker or base, functionally placeless and largely
self-referential”. It is the convention of the pedestal that is the link between the clearly “understood and inhabited”
form of sculpture and its radical abstraction. Krauss notes the works of Brancusi here as particular examples of
sculpture negating its monumental function, depicting its own autonomy by reaching downward to “absorb the
pedestal into itself and away from actual place”. Arriving in the 1950s however, this exploration had entered “black
hole” territory, beyond the abstraction of the monument and into “pure negativity” as a form without substance of its
own: “sculpture is what you bump into when you back up to see a painting”, Krauss quotes artist Barnett Newman.
But “it would probably be more accurate to say” that from the early 1960s “sculpture had entered a categorical noman’s-land”. Krauss found that the work of a number of artists in the late 60s (she cites Robert Morris, Robert
Smithson, Michael Heizer and Richard Serra among others) did not demonstrate the modernist “demand for the
purity and separateness of the various mediums” (pp. 41–43). They no longer stuck to one medium, and they no
longer worked that medium continuously. Instead they seemed to be “moving continually and erratically”, making
work that could only be described as “what was on or in front of a building that was not a building, or what was in
the landscape that was not the landscape” (p. 36). It had “ceased being a positivity” and was “now the category that
resulted from the addition of the not-landscape to the not-architecture”. Krauss (p. 38) called this “a combination of
exclusions” presenting it diagrammatically as shown in Figure 1:
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Figure 1 The limits of modernist sculpture as illustrated diagrammatically by Rosalind Krauss, 1979

Nonfiction as what-it-is-not
Contemporary observers have pointed out that the ‘blurry’ category of nonfiction is also one that can only really be
defined only by what-it-is-not. D’Agata (2009, p. 467) calls nonfiction “a conditional state of being, and one that is
essentially a negation of genre”, or as Shields (2010, p. 131) puts it, in a characteristic metaphor, “an entire dresser
labeled nonsox” (all those smalls that don’t fit any drawer, you know?). Ever since it emerged as an artistic category
the term ‘nonfiction’ has sat awkwardly as something that can only be critically defined as a negative condition of
both fictional and factual stories: a categorythat is only what-it-is-not. While it is noted (Lehman 1997; Carlin 2012;
Singer & Walker 2013a) that critical literature on nonfiction is thin on the ground, we might begin as Krauss does by
tracing nonfiction’s historical conventions. As Singer (2013, p. 142) points out, contemporary nonfiction may resist
easy categorisation, but it has conventions all the same. Singer nominates “narrative realism” as nonfiction’s
foundational convention, being the use of sensory imagery, the inclusion of concrete, significant details, well-crafted
realistic dialogue, and point of view perspective that are used “to varying degrees, by historians and scientists and
journalists as well as by fiction and nonfiction writers” to tell stories that feel realistic. “Creative nonfiction”, Singer
says, “both builds on the conventions of narrative realism and at times reinvents them.”
Beginning here takes us to the USA in the 1960s. The New Journalism came out of a movement of feature writers at
titles such as New York Magazine, Esquire, The Evening Standard, The Herald Tribune and Rolling Stone Magazine,
who began using the techniques of literary realism in their reporting of the social tumult of 1960s America. Tom
Wolfe (1973, p. 46), one of The New Journalism’s most well-known exponents, describes how these reporters used
“the devices that gave the realistic novel its unique power”, its sense of “concrete reality”, and “absorbing quality”
in their feature articles and political reporting. Wolfe nominates four techniques found in realist novels of writers
such as Balzac, Dickens and James, that The New Journalists used to create the desired effect: scene-by-scene
construction; the use of realistic dialogue; point-of-view, that is “presenting every scene to the reader through the
eyes of a particular character”; and the recording of “status details” that help build a sense of character. For instance,
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Wolfe (p. 33) describes using a “Jamesian” point of view that entered directly into the mind of his subject in the
opening paragraph of a profile on record producer Phil Spector:
All these raindrops are high or something. They don’t roll down the window, they come straight back,
toward the tail, wobbling, like all those Mr. Cool snowheads walking on mattresses. The plane is taxiing
out toward the runway to take off, and this stupid infarcted water wobbles, sideways, across the window.
Of the Spector profile, Wolfe says journalists from a competing paper considered the story “an improbable feat…
and merely a fiction that appropriated [Spector’s] name” because it purported to know what was going on in
Spector’s mind. But he counters that Spector himself had found it quite accurate, and that “this should have come as
no surprise, since every detail in the passage was taken from a long interview with Spector about exactly how he had
felt at the time”. The New Journalists, Wolfe said, simply extended the standard journalistic interview from whowhat-when-where-why facts to questions about thoughts and emotions as well. Like the sculptural artists of the
1960s, The New Journalists were pushing at the limits of defining cultural discourses. The New Journalism
disrupted “the assumption that history ‘happens’ and can be discovered as a first cause” (Lehman 1997, p. 16) and
that the reporter or the historian could be seen as a neutral observer of it. Norman Mailer (quoted in Frus 1994, p.
128) said The New Journalism exposed “one of the greatest lies of all time”, that the reporter “pretended to be
objective”. Mailer described his own work as “an enormously personalised journalism where the character of the
narrator was one of the elements”. The New Journalists broke the illusion of neutrality and objectivity of the press
by making themselves, their reporting processes part of the story—“resisting closure, exposing their reporting and
writing processes, and deemphasising unity in favour of contradiction, complexity and open-endedness” (Frus 1994,
p. 132).
In ‘The Reality Effect’, Barthes (1975, p. 146) found both literary realism and journalistic reporting were part of a
nineteenth century “regnum of ‘objective’ history”, which saw “the development of techniques, of works, and
institutions based on the incessant need to authenticate the ‘real’” to show it as “self-sufficient” and outside social
systems of meaning. For Barthes and other post-structuralists, the confluence of linguistics, anthropology, Marxism
and psychoanalysis had shown that subjectivity (our experience of what’s real) and epistemology (our knowledge of
what’s real) is always already inscribed in language and cannot be known outside it. Positivist representations of
history and ‘reality’ on which journalism is based, are not ‘truth’, but rather, an effect of language. In a semiotic
analysis of the realist technique of nineteenth-century novelists, Barthes (pp. 147–148) found that:
Flaubert’s barometer, Michelet’s little door finally say nothing but this: we are the real; it is the category of
‘the real’ (and not its contingent contents) which is then signified; in other words, the very absence of the
signified, to the advantage of the referent alone, becomes the very signifier of realism.
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By purporting a transparent relationship between the signifier (the word) and the referent (the concrete detail),
narrative realism excludes one of the tripartite aspects of the sign: the signified. The contingency of the sign, which
for Barthes is the inherent energy in language (“what is alive”) is closed off which, paradoxically, takes us further
away from authenticity rather than closer. The empirical conventions and practices of history and journalism—being
‘on the spot’, ‘eye-witness reporting’—are no more ‘real’ either. These produce the “referential illusion”, that is “the
direct collusion of a referent and a signifier”. What is present and material in these moments is only speech itself, the
performative “speech act”:
All this shows that the ‘real’ is supposed to be self-sufficient, that it is strong enough to belie any notion of
‘function’, that its ‘speech-act’ has no need to be integrated into a structure and that the having-been-there
of things is a sufficient principle of speech.
(p.147)
As the social tumult of the 1960s unfolded in the USA and in Europe, nonfiction narratives could be understood as a
“narrative manifestation of the epistemological crisis of our age of suspicion” in which the “antithetical narrative
poles” of the fictional and the factual were “no longer capable of dealing with current literary realities” (Zavarzadeh
1976, p. 41). Zavarzadeh proposed that texts have a referential “direction”, either an orderly “inward” direction
toward a textual world “mapped out within a book” (p. 55) or a messy and open-ended outward referential direction.
The nonfiction novel was a narrative “balanced between the two directions with no final allegiance to either the
inner or outer world” (Zavarzadeh, quoted in Heyne 1987, p. 484). For Frus (1994, p. 161), post-structuralist
insights meant the ongoing pursuit of any difference between fictional and factual narrative was pointless: “The
text’s materiality is the same, whether the events outlined have externally attested counterparts or not, and whether
or not the characters have historical referents”. The difference between literary narrative and journalistic narrative
was a matter only of cultural categories and hegemonies. Nonfiction combines techniques from both “objectivity
and objective realism” and “calls attention to what has been suppressed in [their] separation” (p. 121). That is, the
material labour involved in the production of the poetic, and the human decisions involved in the production of
history.
But Lehman (1997) pursued something different. While maintaining that “no platform exists outside of politics and
culture wherein the narrative’s ‘factual accuracy’ can be putatively determined” (p. 16), Lehman also insists that “the
confession that, finally, it is impossible to delineate an exact boundary between fiction and nonfiction does not mean
that the boundary does not matter” (p. 5). Lehman proposes “an implicated reading of nonfiction” through “an active
contest of readings and referentiality” (p. 38). History here is “both text and experience” (p. 3) in which the reader is
engaged “over the edge”, “both inside and outside the story”. The “text of events” intersects the written text, and
“different written texts intersect with each other”. The inescapable presence of the implicated, embodied human
subject “makes facts matter in nonfictional stories” (p. 165).
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The nonfiction text is then, a “contradiction” (Lehman 1997, p. 23) a disruptive category that problematises the
opposition between factual and fictional narratives. It is a “theoretical catalyst or irritant in considering intertwined
questions of ethics and aesthetics” (Carlin and Rendle-Short 2013, p.3). The ‘in-between-ness’ of nonfiction is
inherent in the term itself: nonfiction is a conditional calibration, it is not-fiction but it is not fiction’s opposite,
either. It is both not-fact and not-fiction: it is what Krauss called “a combination of exclusions”. Following Krauss’s
method, we can present this situation diagrammatically in Figure 2:

Figure 2 Nonfiction presented diagrammatically as a combination of exclusions

The Klein Group
As in the diagram in Figure 3 (Krauss 1979, p. 37), the “expression of a logical opposition stated as a pair of
negatives” can be expressed in the positive by a similarly logical inversion. Krauss represented this schematically
using a mathematical diagram known as a “Klein Group”. The Klein Group expands a binary “into a quaternary
field which both mirrors the original opposition and at the same time opens it” (p. 38). The field is now expanded
and characterised by three different relationships of opposition to the key binary: firstly, a pure contradiction
between the key terms; secondly, an opposition of involution (reflexive opposition) running vertically on the
diagram between the key terms and their negative conditions; and thirdly, a relation of implication, running
diagonally across the diagram (i.e. the double negative that becomes the positive). Within this field, it is position in
relation to these characterising oppositions that is the new logic of practice.
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Figure 3 The field of sculpture expanded using the logic of the Klein Group by Rosalind Krauss, 1979

Figure 4 The field of nonfiction expanded using the logic of the Klein Group
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Using this method to expand the field of nonfiction (Figure 4) opens up a new way to think about nonfiction writing
practice. In Figure 4, the opposition fiction/fact is transposed onto its classical expression poetry/history first
articulated in Aristotle’s Poetics (Lehman 1997, p. 16). As with sculpture’s expanded field, the expanded field of
nonfiction is characterised by three different relationships of opposition. The neuter is the negative aspect of the
field which has, to date, defined what we understand to be ‘nonfiction’. But directly opposite this is the complex.
Here, discursive and creative possibilities are opened within the field for enquiries that are both poetic and historical
in nature. Each approach to nonfiction practice can exist within a field in which “there are other, differently
structured possibilities’ (Krauss 1979 p. 38). This is the almost exquisite paradox at the heart of Krauss’s method: a
concern with location and precision amid broadening diversity and possibility.

The complex: poetics and difference

Figure 5 The expanded field of nonfiction with emphasis on ‘the complex’

In their “unavoidable and necessary” manifesto of ‘nonfiction poetry’ The Realpoetik, Wilkinson and Alizadeh
(2012, n.p.) proclaim “the unquantifiable potential of poetic writing to convey a deeper experience of reality and
‘real life’ accounts than may be possible through nonfiction prose”. The Realpoetik proposes the poetic play of line
and space, pause and rhythm, imagery, metaphor and frisson, as tools for unsettling the “historical landscape of facts
and accuracies” drawing attention to “gaps in the historical imaginary”. Wilkinson elsewhere (2014, n.p) expands on
this point, proposing that an “extension of non-fiction writing into the poetic form” is a way to address “historical
inaccuracies and aporias, thus not only opening a space for the representation of marginal voices, but offering new
frameworks for life writing.” The Realpoetik, and nonfiction poetics including the lyric essay, are modes that can be
positioned in the complex of the expanded field (Figure 5). Poetry and ‘the poetic’ here is conceived as a textual
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mode for writing difference, animated by the “immense power of the semiotic undercurrent of poetic language”
(Wilkinson and Alizadeh, 2012 n.p.) unravelled by feminist theorist Julia Kristeva.
In Revolution in Poetic Language (1984) Kristeva articulates her theory of the semiotic and the symbolic, two
modalities of the signifying process that makes up language. The semiotic and symbolic are inseparable within the
signifying process, and create a dialectic which “determines the type of discourse (narrative, metalanguage, theory,
poetry, etc.)” (Kristeva 1984, p. 112). “In other words,” she says, “so-called natural language allows for different
modes of articulation of the semiotic and the symbolic”. The symbolic is the domain of the structure and grammar of
language. The semiotic is part of signification, but “not reducible to language”; it is concerned with sounds, rhythms
and tones that can be seen to be meaningful parts of language, but which do not directly represent or signify (Oliver
2002). Kristeva’s semiotic analysis deconstructs the enlightenment subject in this way, opening the possibility for
poetic language to be understood as the designation of “the process that exceeds the subject and his communicative
structures” (Kristeva 1984, p. 4).
Kristevan poetics is a useful lens through which to view the ‘lyric essay’, a form increasingly being taken up in
nonfiction writing practice. The lyric essay “partakes of the poem in its density and shapeliness, its distillation of
ideas and musicality of language” and it “partakes of the essay in its weight, in its overt desire to engage with facts”
(Tall & D’Agata 1997, p. 7). It relinquishes the structures and syntax of prose for movement “by association”, “by
way of imagery or connotation”, “by juxtaposition or sidewinding poetic logic”. For D’Agata (2014, p. 9) the
affordances of the lyric essay offer a way to write “the very messy, multi-dimensional, multilayered” business of
knowing, and how we find that knowledge “is problematic the moment we start trying to nail it down”. In this way,
the current mood for the lyric essay in nonfiction form is not about trendy experimentalism or glib formal play, but
the desire to write ‘the real’ from subject positions of difference. Building on feminist scholarship, these positions
may now include those which are non-unitary, relational, and multiply-aligned (Braidotti 2013, p. 144).
Writing positions in the complex allow for what intersectional criticism acknowledges as “multiplex
epistemologies” (Phoenix & Pattynama 2006, p. 187) arising from subject positions crossed by multiple relations of
power and affective forces at once. These intersections may bring layers of contradiction, or present blockages to
utterance, or call for the use of varied mediums, or multi-lingual or multi-disciplinary or multi-cultural responses (to
suggest a few basic scenarios). A writer may find a great deal of complex personal and affective material must be
worked through before they can arrive anywhere near the privileged clearing in which conventional writing
positions reside—a writer may find they can never get there. Here, “the lived, inevitable embodied and affective
experience” (Gibbs 2007, p. 224) of the writer engaged in the difficult work of knowing, and coming to a writing
position, is the material process designated in poetic language. It is the poetic “asserted as the manifold”, “a
dispersed function of the social scrutiny of language … composed of diverse elements having several apertures for
making multiple connections” (Duplessis 1996, p. 22).
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The schemas: the reflexive text, the performative self

Figure 6 The expanded field of nonfiction with emphasis on ‘the schemas’

On either side of the Klein Group are the schemas (Figure 6), opening out laterally from the vertical opposition
between the fields’ key terms and their involution. This part of the field is where we might locate various and multilayered textual enquiries that have, indeed, characterised postmodern literature for some decades. A review of
Reality Hunger in The Harvard Crimson (McAuley 2010) entitled ‘Shields’ Modernist Manifesto Arrives A Few
Decades Too Late’ noted that ideas around truth, authenticity and the artificiality inherent in traditional narrative
structures are those that “most students of literature will have encountered at some point or other in their career”.
There are certainly many well documented ‘postmodern’ literary practices of writing. As Singer notes (2013, p.
147), there is a long list of writers from Robbe-Grillet to Atwood who have for decades experimented with
‘postmodern’ techniques such as “anti-mimetic fictions”, “metaleptic jokes”, “dislocated narrations”, “unreliable
narrations”, “contradictory storylines” and “metafictions”. One of the greatest critical influences here has of course
been Barthes’s (1977b) ‘The Death of the Author’.
Like the “reality effect” and “the referential illusion”, Barthes’s “death of the author” arose from post-structuralist
insights into the relationship between language, the subject and social systems of meaning. Through this lens, the
Author becomes a ‘tyrannical’ myth of bourgeois culture, encumbered by an outdated “psychology of the Ego”. The
concept “the death of the author” posed that “linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing”. The
theoretical removal of the Author “utterly transforms the modern text” and the practice of writing, changing it from a
transcendent practice of (male) genius to a “performative” act, in which “the modern scriptor is born simultaneously

25

with the text” in a new temporal frame: “there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally
written here and now” (Barthes 1977b, p. 145). In another significant essay, Krauss (1980, p.37-38) inaugurates a
genre she terms “the paraliterary” to capture this kind of post-structuralist play in the essays of both Barthes and
Derrida, which “simply cannot be called criticism, but…cannot, for that matter, be called not-criticism either”. The
paraliterary is a “space of debate, quotation, partisanship, betrayal, reconciliation…drama without the Play, voices
without the Author, criticism without the Argument”. She might have added autobiography without the Self, as in
Barthes’s performative Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (Barthes 2010) which, remains a provocative example for
contemporary writers of nonfiction. “It is not news now to say that there is no such thing as the self, it is [still] news,
however, to show how this works in the practice of writing,” writes Phillips (2010, p. x), in a foreword to the 2010
edition. While many postmodern novels have played with performativity of the Author and the text, nonfiction
writers are now playing with the performativity of the self, the subject and her identity in “works of nonfiction that
similarly transgress mimetic bounds”(Singer 2013, p. 146).
In contemporary terms, the performative “carries the authority of two quite different discourses” (Kosofsky
Sedgwick 2003, p. 7). As well as meaning ‘non-referential’ speech acts, as described above by Barthes, performative
acts now also derive meaning from discourses of theatre and performance through the work of Judith Butler.
Butler’s theory of performativity posits that gender is produced through “discursively constrained performative acts”
(1990, p. 25) that are non-verbal and embodied actions as well as linguistic. This non-verbal, embodied performative
self, enacted through visual, live and image mediums (as in discourses of theatre) expands the “image repertoire”
(Barthes 2010, p. 158) of signs through which the performative autobiographical subject is able to access herself. In
the expanded field, writing is no longer defined by medium (the word, the page) but can include image, sound and
audio and other design elements, that is to say “a shifting matrix of visuality and textuality” (Smith & Watson 2002,
p. 3) enabled by digital technologies. The condition of the field here “intimates aspects of the visual or pictorial turn
in culture” in which writing might be less about traditional forms of the literary, and more about “an increasingly
complex and composite form of the literary-visual” (Nuttall 2012, p. 410).
In her ‘Essay on the Essay’ (1996, p. 17), Rachel Blau Duplessis articulates the “cross-vectors of various reading
communities” captured by their interest in ‘politicised poetic prose’, a term she proposes as an alternative to the
“singularly antiseptic and unlovely” ‘creative nonfiction’:
… academic production and its variants; social commentary and its variants; artistic production (often
innovative, speaking in multiple registers, drawn to visual texts); cultural commentary participating
performatively and politically in what it observes; the elegant philosophical writing called ‘theory’ and its
filiations; autobiographical productions of self (invested or suspicious); self-studies situated in relation to a
community; sermons of arousal and confessions of despair and recovery; diaristic or meditative works
engaging with the specificity of moments as events (a mortal illness for instance, or world rancour and its
detritus) spiral beyond our readiness.
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These are the varied kinds of practices that have been going on in arts worlds, in theatre, in poetry, as well as in the
creative practices of academia, which an expanded field can accommodate. Shields (2010, p. 199) rails against a
notion of literature beholden to the page, “the blockbuster novel” for instance: “Is it possible that contemporary
literary prizes are a bit like the federal bailout package, subsidizing work that is no longer remotely describing
reality?”

Writing as research in the expanded field of nonfiction
Methods of writing as research consider writing as “a mode of enquiry in its own right”, something that is
“continuous with” and “in large part, produces” knowledge rather than simply being a neutral container for it (Gibbs
2007 p. 222). In this way, methods of writing as research can be situated within the expanded field because they
already enact the shift in practice that the field permits. That is, they take a position in relation to academic
conventions of objectivity and neutrality, to enact a new kind of critical writing practice. Writing as research is a
reflexive, qualitative research method that takes as a point of departure the theoretical premise that “writing, method,
methodology, epistemology, ethics and politics are inextricably linked” (Lykke et al. 2014, p. 3). As with all “textual
staging” (Richardson & Adams St Pierre 2000, p. 960) scholarly writing is not neutral, it is “a sociohistorical
construction, and is therefore, mutable”.
For the near-decade of my immersion in this project, one thing has never changed; it will not, for any length be
neatly divided into ‘creative’ and ‘critical’ writing. Many times, writing chapters in a conventional academic voice
seemed like an efficient way to ‘get it done’, but every time I tried I would come up against a terrible block. My
writing voice would seize up and I would find myself in some kind of stand-off between my desire to get words on
the page and the authentic curiosity that was driving my enquiries. It felt something like what Gibbs (2005)
amusingly describes as the “paralysing” voice of “disciplinary authority and discursive protocol” acting as “a kind
of watchful superego”. Even the greatest critics have felt this kind of straight jacket. In his contemplation of the
possibilities afforded by the essay form, Dillon (2017, p. 100) writes of Susan Sontag’s self-diagnosis of the
“problem” with her celebrated critical prose: “thinness…It is meagre, sentence by sentence. Too architectural, too
discursive”. In 1970 she confesses in her diary “I think I am ready to learn to write. Think with words, not with
ideas”. What was Sontag getting at? Perhaps a yearning for the “lift and loft of feeling-thinking” that Duplessis
(1996, p. 18) proposes we can access through the essay.
The essay is, of course, in its Baconian tradition the ‘neutral container’ for academic writing. But in its Montaignian
tradition of “elaborating doubts and uncertainties” (Carlin 2018) and feminist contributions that “bring the speaking
body back into [its] discourses” (Oliver 2002, ‘Introduction’, para 15) the essay can be understood as a method of
writing as research. Duplessis (1996, p. 19) refers to the essay as a material process, “a thinking” that occurs
“through the material fabrication of language, a work and a working in language, not simply a working through
intellectually or emotionally—language not as a summary of findings but as the inventor of finding”.
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This obviously chimes very closely with the notion cited above, that considers writing as something that is
“continuous with” and “in large part, produces” knowledge (Gibbs 2007 p. 222). In particular, this kind of essaying
resonates with the commonly cited method of writing as research known as ‘fictocriticism’. Like the essay,
fictocriticism is a process of material thinking rather than a set of writing conventions. A “way of writing for which
there is no blueprint” and which “must be constantly invented anew” at each attempt (Gibbs 2005, para 3-4).
Fictocritical form is fluid, and determined by “the singular problems that arise in the course of engagement with
what is researched”. It might be poetic, or narrative or analytical, or dialogical, the “heterogeneity of fictocritical
forms bears witness to [its]existence as a necessarily performative mode” that is “always singular and … a very
precise and local intervention” that is “strictly speaking inimitable”.
This positional specificity, which again, chimes with Duplessis’s essaying (1996, p. 25) as “a situated practice of
knowing made up by the untransparent situated subject”, figured out “on the ground, virtually in the time of
writing”, also aligns with the notion of writing positions in the expanded field. Key in the transformation of practice
in the expanded field is the possibility for writers to move within it, occupying any number of positions according to
their enquiry, which is precisely what essaying and the fictocritical method are describing. Writing positions within
the expanded field can be understood as multiple and indeterminate until they appear. Even as we identify the
relational characteristics of each part of the expanded field, we cannot know exactly what an individual writer will
produce from each position because it will be different according to the nature of each enquiry. This is the almost
exquisite paradox of the expanded field: a concern with location and precision amid broadening diversity. All this is
to say that both fictocriticism and essaying are methods of writing as research that are “joyously contingent” (Carlin
2018), that come together as knowledge through writing as a process of “positional politics that challenge
hegemonic banalities” (Duplessis 1996, p. 19). Positions that can be mapped in the expanded field of nonfiction.
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Prelude: (approaching my mother)
At some point, I do it. I get dressed up as my mother’s daughter and go to the source. I make my way up Collins
Street toward ‘The Club’, an establishment bolt-hole in the centre of Melbourne for lady members and their guests.
At a set of anonymous brass doors sandwiched between a jeweller and a Prada store, I step into a vestibule where an
attendant sits waiting to sign me in. She directs me to the ‘cloakroom’, an anteroom behind the antique lift furnished
with a chaise longue, a dressing-table and a full-length mirror next to a Victorian dressing screen. I check my hair
and my lipstick and tuck in my shirt (it’s silk and it keeps slipping).
A woman introduces herself as Anne and escorts me to the lift. “Maybe she’s in the Green Room,” she says, ‘let’s
go and have a look, shall we?’ We take the lift down one floor and Anne slides open the lift’s old concertina door.
We poke our heads out into a room decorated in shades of forest, laurel, mint and moss. “No, it doesn’t look like
she’s in here,” Anne says. “Let’s go up and have a look in the Dining Room. If she’s not there she might be in the
Library.” When we get to the Dining Room, my mother is sitting on one of the chintz sofa settings underneath the
windows. “You look smart,” she says. Yes, I do. It’s not an accident.
I sink into a plumped armchair, running my fingers along its upholstered arm, and taking in the sheen of its thread.
There are two shades of mint on the walls, and another in the carpet, and I think, “This room is also very green, why
do they call the other one the Green Room?” But even though I’ve been to this place many times before, I don’t
know the answer to this or any other of its mysteries, because I have gone out of my way not to find out. Now my
shameful curiosity must be smuggled in.
I thought this story would rest on histories. I thought that it would turn on events that had happened to me, and
perhaps also that had happened to her. I thought that writing would be a process of excavation and weaving-together
of these details that might start in the family archives, that might give me a clue to the mystery of my own anxiety,
that might illuminate something about my mother’s anxiety—or maybe I’d find clues about someone else, buried
secrets, I don’t know. But now, sitting here opposite my mother in my heels and my ironed slacks, I realise this is
not the case. There is a story, but it is not buried. It’s hiding in plain sight. It’s in the two shades of mint on the walls
and another in the carpet. It’s in the sheen of the upholstery and the shellac of my mother’s hairspray. It’s rubbed
into the French-polished tables until you can see your face in it. It’s in all these mint-condition surfaces clinging to a
past. A waitress comes with our drinks. She sets down two white coasters, then a little silver pot filled with four
cheese biscuits and two dainty breadsticks. Then she places two tumblers with gin, and pours the tonic from elegant
single-serve bottles—just a splash—and sets the rest aside.
“Cheers.”
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the instinct to ‘club’

this was the beginning

Mrs C.H. Campbell, Mrs Lowther Clarke, Mrs Robert Harper,
Mrs Alex Landale, Mrs Edward Miller, Lady O’Loghlen, Mrs Fred Payne, Mrs
Robert Power, Mrs Charles Ryan, Mrs Harry Staughton, Mrs Gyles Turner

each one of these Committee ladies was experienced in her own
home management, and as a hostess

much shrewd appreciation of what was necessary to
maintain control of the suitability of candidates

she should be ‘clubable’.
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a Large Drawing Room and a Small Drawing Room, also known as
the Members’ Drawing Room, a Large Dining Room and a Small Dining
Room, a Dressing Room, a Strangers’ Room, an office for Miss Living





















an uncertain number of bedrooms

the faint all-pervading smell of gas.

firescreens





tablecovers
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the Bluthner Grand offered by Glen’s Music House at a special price






indoor plants and general bric-a-brac

an inch or two off the legs

tea parties
receptions in the grand manner with music
a suggestion from members was approved that a pageboy be engaged and it was decided
he should wear a livery of blue and silver






a real Edwardian touch
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 candidates












unfortunate Temporary Members

eagle eyes



a request sent by a magazine for photographs








weaknesses in the system

declined
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the waiting list was scrutinised and the sponsors of two candidates were
warned they would be unlikely to be elected

Mrs Charles Luckock’s immaculate riding kit
















in the Drawing Room

‘ballot’

‘wastepaper’

side by side against one wall

perforated sheets

______ cat
three referees,
thirty-five votes were required



35








one blackball cancelled eight votes

The blackball box, painted black with the word ‘blackball’ in white lettering
was to be placed against the opposite wall. This was to require voters who
wished to cast a blackball to turn around deliberately to reach the box.

a suitable pause

reasonably good grace








kindly women that they were,
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On her appointment she was promised six months’ leave to go
home to see her mother when she had completed twenty-five years’ service

the Ceylon tea was poor

particularly the scones.
anything she could to improve the scones

no China tea: why not?
one of the Dining Rooms was hot

the mats at the entrance to the lift and at the foot of the stairs

incoming mail being put in the letter-rack for all to see
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whether they had finished their lunch or not

Miss Bors, explained on behalf of the Committee, that the rule had
been copied from the book of rules of the well-known proprietary club, the
Ladies Empire Club.

An amendment to Rule XIV providing for at least three
calendar months’ notice to members of the intention to make an alteration,
which was moved by Mrs Henry Cave and seconded by Mrs Charles Ryan, was
not approved

Miss Bors could not see reason

Lady Madden reminded her, however, that with the legal advice available to
her (from her husband, Sir John) no mistakes of that kind were likely to occur
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five resignations (three of which would have come in anyway)







twenty-six letters of protest (principally from Toorak)

Mrs Guy Smith was called in to umpire
















“scarcely a tearoom in Melbourne
in which within half an hour of the close the fullest information about the meeting
was not being given”
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and unfortunately placed next to a pub

too far in the wrong direction

sound common sense, tact, friendliness and a graceful manner

this petty idea was not altogether watertight
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Mad woman on the sheep farm

Figure 7 Prize Combing Merino Rams, 1873 & 1874, family photograph

Amongst her picture frames, my mother has a photographic portrait of two sheep called ‘Bruce’ and ‘Prince
William’ posed under large eucalypts next to a paddock dam (Figure 7). They are “Prize Combing Merino Rams
1873 & 1874”, the portrait tells us, “Bred by John Murray, Murray Vale, Mount Crawford, South Australia” and
“Fed on uncultivated lands only”. The weight of their winning fleece was 15¾ & 16¼ lbs. At about the time that
they won this prize, these animals were at the centre of new colonial riches as “wool, wheat, coal, copper and gold”
were establishing their place as the foundation of “a wealthy society” in Australia (Matthews 1984, p. 49). Two
members of this new wealthy colonial society were Scottish-born brothers Alexander and John Murray who in 1841
introduced Macarthur merino sheep to South Australia. The Murrays produced “champion sheep noted for fine,
heavy fleeces and large carcases” (Cannon & Haye 1985, p. 26) and by the late 1890s they had sold “more than
20,000 stud rams at high prices” and established a homestead called Murray Vale at Mt Crawford, South Australia.
After the First World War, John Murray’s grandson, Eric Murray, grazed these merinos on Petherton Station about
200km north of Adelaide. Eric Murray was my great-grandfather.
Of the particular brand of stifled femininity being distilled in these colonial society families, a book on my mother’s
shelf called The Long Last Summer: Australia’s Upper Class Before The Great War speaks of “many a
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psychological tragedy” (Cannon & Haye 1985, p. 14) as a result of the restrictions and prohibitions imposed on
girls. These included of course, “undue displays of emotion or curiosity in public” and “probing and questioning in
general conversation”. On her visit to Australia in 1898, sociologist and public intellectual Beatrice Webb writes
with pointed disdain of the “nicely-mannered but idle, empty headed” daughters of the well-to-do who were
“uncommonly inferior to then men”. “Certainly these colonial women are in an unpleasant stage of development”
she wrote in a diary of the trip (quoted in Austin 1965, p. 47). Dr Alexander Morrison, Headmaster of Scotch
College (the boys’ school busy educating future Prime Ministers of the time), is on the record as agreeing that the
well-to-do women were “the least worthy product of Australia” (Cannon & Haye 1985, p. 32). Here is another
framed photograph from my mother’s house:

Figure 8 Ranfurlie, family photograph

This imposing Victorian mansion (Figure 8) is ‘Ranfurlie’ owned by William Knox, the founding Secretary of
Broken Hill Proprietary Company (the mining behemoth we now know as BHP). You can almost see the mad
woman in the attic can’t you? The “mad woman in the attic” was the anxious, speechless, domestically confined
figure that Gilbert and Gubar found inhabiting the writing of Austen, Dickinson and the Brontës in their
breakthrough work of feminist literary criticism, The Madwoman in the Attic (1979). They found that “breathing
beneath dominant Victorian myths of women as domestic angels” were patterns of “confinement, starvation,
monstrosity, and rebellion” (Federico 2009, p. 2). It was following this critique that tropes of “madness and
monstrosity, domesticity and escape” (p. 3) became part of the critical and cultural vocabulary for reading
nineteenth-century femininity. The mad women in the attics of these nineteenth-century colonial mansions of
Australia had the advantage, of course, over Indigenous women who were not even considered to be citizens, or
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people with basic human rights. And they were tended to by other white women who didn’t have the luxury of
invalidism, as miserable as it might have been. The mad woman in the attic—the ‘crazy white woman’, as a
Singaporean poet I know calls her—had her own privileges that many of her descendants have used to get out of the
attic. She is now sometimes even considered an anachronism. But not in my family. For me, this domestically
confined and stifled ‘mad woman’ is still a live and a present threat.
William Knox had five sons, and two daughters: Mary Catherine and Jean Marjorie. Jean Marjorie was my greatgrandmother. She married Eric Murray and raised three daughters at Petherton. Their second daughter, Catherine
Sheila, was my grandmother. My grandmother did not have an attic, but she had a ‘downstairs’. It was my uncle’s
room, where he lived well into his late forties. Something had happened to my uncle, but no one ever said what.
When I was young I asked my mother about it, and she gave me a suitably vague answer: “He can’t cope with
stress.” I have come to understand that he had a breakdown in his twenties, but it seems there was more to it than
that. Very soon after Catherine Sheila died in the late 1990s, he came out. He told the family he was gay and moved
into a flat. My mother doesn’t have an attic, but she has a ‘spare room’ that she frequently suggests I move into,
especially when I have been sick and depressed, and when I am at my most vulnerable. There are times she has
literally tried to come and ‘pick me up’ (like a child, like a chattel) from where I am situated in my own life, and
sequester me back into hers. My mother has spent her own life anxious and angry and confined in the home, and I
know that confining me to her ‘spare room’ is her dark wish. Sometimes it has been my own. Out of perverse love
and loyalty, part of me has wanted to join her in stifled domestic misery so she is not so alone. This is an unspoken
emotional fight (to certain death) with her hold on me, and my own dark desires, that I have had no choice but to
wage.
I want to tell this part of my story of illness, but as much as I want to tell it, I want to refuse it. When I go to write, it
is not the pen that I find myself turning toward, it is the scissors, the scalpel, the ink-eraser. Since the turn of the
twentieth century, writers and artists have used material methods of the cutting and tearing, and syntactical methods
of rupture and rearrangement to refuse oppressive histories and mythical realities. During this research, I have found
myself drawn to these material strategies to find a way through this difficult history, to find a place for my anger and
also a place for “un-limiting the kinds of self it becomes possible to produce both in politics and in writing” (Nuttall
2014, p. 164). Using the cut, the erasure and the image to approach this maternal family history reveals the surface
of the page as a textual interface where complex layers of myth and identify coexist in autobiographical acts.
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The cut, the page, the palimpsest: rewriting toxic femininity
She’s disfigured but calm, wearing a string of pearls and a slight demure smile. Her dark hair is pulled into a bun on
top of her head, but she has no forehead. Her hairline begins at the bridge of her nose and her eyes are different sizes
and set wide at the top of each cheekbone. Hannah Höch’s Deutsches Mädchen (Lavin 1993, p. 122; see Figure 9) is
a caricature of a traditional German feminine ideal, pieced together from
fragments cut from Weimar culture’s new photoweeklies and fashion
magazines. The inter-war years in Germany saw a rapid acceleration of
industrial modernity and print media (p. 5). Hannah Höch’s
photomontages took a razor to new titles such as Beliner Illustrirte
Zeitung and the ‘ultra-modern’ fashion magazine Die Dame, literally
cutting through discourses of femininity congealing on their newly
cheap and accessible pages. Deutsches Mädchen both draws on and
subverts the language of the emerging modern visual culture, using a
standard portrait format in which the young woman’s face and neck are
seen in three-quarter profile (p. 17), but literally hacks into these
pictorial conventions, upsetting them with grotesque mismatched
features. Höch’s ‘Porträts’ series of 1920 to 1930 includes dozens of
these unsettling compositions of female figures. Fröliche Dame (p. 127;
see Figure 10), massacres tropes of beauty still found in the fashion
media today. The figure’s ear is adorned with a glamorous hooped
earring, her skin is pale and unblemished and her eyes downcast. Her
full lips and smooth hair are all beautiful in isolation. But the lips arrive
too far up the face and collide with a nose that is too small. The smooth
skin is patchworked like a bad skin graft, that has made the nose, cheek

Figure 9 Deutsches Mädchen (German Girl), Hannah
Höch, 1930, photomontage

and brow a different shade of pale to the lower cheek, chin and ear. The crown of her head also invokes the scalpel,
sliced off and streamlined like a modern machine.
There is an unmistakable force of anger and refusal in Höch’s imagery that comes from the deliberate violence of
her material process. Marcus (2009, p. 207) describes Fröliche Dame as “a burn victim smiling”, an image that
evokes the horrific facial injuries of soldiers coming back from the front during WWI with their lips, cheeks and
jaws blown off. Höch’s working method was to clip images from print media and insert fragments directly into the
montage (Lavin 1993, p. 6), maintaining the rough materiality of each mismatched fragment. This process and the
resulting images were radical oppositional gestures of the time. Höch was a member of Berlin Dada, and part of an
avant-garde who were the first of the modern age to question “the very production of meaning and the efficacy of
art” using “agitation, polemic, and disorder” and “strategies of negation” (p. 16). While her works can be playful and
humorous, the gesture of her cut is not benign. It is a refusal of meanings complicit with oppressive social realities.
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Höch’s works cut through what Roland Barthes (2009) would,
decades later, famously call myth. Barthesian myth is a “type of
speech” (p. 131) that “transforms history into nature” (p. 154). In a
number of essays collected and first published in 1957, Barthes
analysed everything from the spectacle of a wrestling match, to the
image of Garbo’s face, to a plate of steak and chips, in order to show
how these ostensibly ‘innocent’ cultural objects in bourgeoise
capitalist culture were actually laden with ideological meaning.
Barthesian myth is a semiological “metalanguage” (p. 138) through
which “language objects”—images, words, social behaviours—are
“endowed with [a] signifying function” through which the social
order is naturalised. The signifier (the language object) and signified
Figure 10 Fröliche Dame (Happy Lady), Hannah
Höch, 1923, photomontage

(the meaning it holds) seem to have a “natural relationship” that is
understood as truth, but which is actually socially laden. The myth-

consumer “takes the signification for a system of facts: myth is read as a factual system, whereas it is but a
semiological system” (p. 58).
Barthesian myth is a “language-robbery” (Barthes 2009, p. 156). The singular meaning of the sign fixed in historical
reality is “impoverished” and “put at a distance” (p. 141). Myth “organises a world which is without contradictions
because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident” (p. 170). Höch’s works show an
instinctive understanding of this semiological metalanguage. One of the first artists in the twentieth century to
recognise the subversive potential of photomontage, Höch created new meanings from mythical ‘language objects’
by placing them in new visual contexts. One of her most famous photomontages is Schnitt mit dem Küchenmesser
Dada durch die letzte weimarer Bierbachkulturepoche Deutschlands (Lavin 1993, p. 20; see Figure 11). In this epic
work, the substantive meaning of images of cultural and historical figures is not destroyed by Höch’s cut. The
dismemberment of the page does not render the mythical language object it holds unintelligible, but rather opens the
possibility of new meaning. Höch’s cut is both destructive and productive, illustrating Barthes’s (2009, p. 143).
point that the knowledge contained in a mythical concept is unstable, made of “yielding, shapeless associations”,
and that its “fundamental character…is to be appropriated”. Höch’s “Dadaist manifesto” (Lavin 1993, p. 19) pits the
Weimar political establishment against Dadaist liberation by appropriating hundreds of images of political leaders
and celebrities, prominent female figures and symbols of new modern society such as machines, crowds, trains and
vehicles. In the upper righthand corner of the montage, Emperor Wilhelm II assumes a pompous regal pose, but his
moustache has been replaced by an image of two wrestlers (one balancing a bread basket with his feet). On his right
shoulder the body of exotic dancer Sent M’ahesa is perched, who has the head of General Field Marshal Friedrich
von Hindenberg (p. 19). Mythologies of traditional political power and authority are undermined by absurd
juxtapositions. General Field Marshal Friedrich von Hindenberg, or any other public figure, would never be
sovereign over their own public image ever again. In the very centre of the work, an image of the popular figure
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Niddy Impekoven, a dancer, here recognisable through her pose and her distinctive costume (p. 32), is set as the
dynamic centre of “the centrifugal dissolution of Weimar heirarchies” (p. 23). The text is left open here too,
however; no reverence is afforded to the figure of Impekoven. Her head has been lopped, and she seems to almost be
juggling the face of Käthe Kollwitz, whose appointment as the first female professor at the
Prussian Academy of Arts had recently been
announced in the media (p. 30). Fluidity and the
play of association, the refusal of any fixed meaning
is the work’s predominant logic.
Höch’s cut recalls another famous material act of
discursive refusal, which came decades later in
William Burroughs’s literary cut-ups. Burroughs
famously composed his ‘Nova Trilogy’ of novels
(1960–1964) and the earlier Naked Lunch (1959)
through methods of randomisation where texts were
ruptured and rearranged by cutting and folding, or
‘natural cut-ups’ “using the eyes” for random
selection (Turner 2019, p. 83). The cut-up method
“restored radical linguistic unfamiliarity” to the
form of the novel in order to “disrupt the syntactic
structure of counterfeit prose (and, by association, of
Figure 11 Schnitt mit dem Küchenmesser Dada durch die letzte
weimarer Bierbachkulturepoche Deutschlands (Cut with the Kitchen
Knife Dada through the last Weimar Beer Belly Cultural Epoch),
Hannah Höch, 1919–1920, photomontage

thought)”. The malevolent dystopian worlds of
Burroughs’s novels dramatise his distrust of
‘counterfeit’ reality and its corruption of language.

Language as ‘a virus’ is one of Burroughs’s most famous metaphors; the word that was once a healthy organism has
turned parasitic, “the fear hate virus” slowly replaces authentic reality with “virus copies”. Burroughs wrote in
1964’s Nova Express (quoted in Turner 2019, p. 85): “Program empty body – A vast tapeworm of bring down word
and image moving through your mind screen always at the same speed on a slow hydraulic spine axis.” Burroughs’s
parasitic ‘virus’ recalls Barthes’s (2009, p. 141) description of myth as a “ceaseless flowing out, a haemorrhage”.
For Barthes, myth is also parasitic, in that it takes root in substantive meaning “from which the form of the myth will
draw its nourishment”. “The meaning will be for the form like an instantaneous reserve of history, a tamed
richness.” For Barthes, as for Burroughs, as for Höch, the material cut and the syntactical rupture is a resistance
against false and deadly mythical reality.
Shields (2010) revives the politics of the cut in Reality Hunger. Throughout the book Shields refers to a concept he
calls “reality-based art” that evokes a violent shattering and exploding of textual surfaces in order to get at
something more authentic. Reality-based art “splinters and explodes” (p. 27), reality-based art “hijacks its material
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and doesn’t apologize” (p. 91). The manifesto itself is a collection of 618 numbered fragments, some of which are
Shields’s own words, and many others which have been appropriated for his own rhetorical purposes. The chapter
titled ‘Collage’ opens with fragment number 312 which tells us “I am quite content to go down to posterity as a
scissors and paste man” (p. 112), words that are originally James Joyce’s. We can find this reference to Joyce and
other citations at the back of the book (included at the insistence of the publisher’s lawyers, Shields tells us) but we
are encouraged not to look. In a disclaimer that comes before the eight pages of references printed with a dotted line
in the margin, readers are told to “simply grab a sharp pair of scissors or a razor blade or box cutter and remove
pages 210–218” (p. 209). Shields implores the reader to “restore this book to the form in which I intended it to be
read”. Appropriation, plagiarism, jamming the mythologies of authorship and literature is exactly the point.
Shields’s notion of ‘reality-based art’ is not fully articulated or theorised in Reality Hunger, but is clearly a reaction
to something he sees as counterfeit and inauthentic produced by a literary industry obsessed with sell-able
narratives, the “big, blockbuster novel by middle-of-the-road writers, the run-of-the-mill four-hundred-page pageturner” (p. 199). “Is it possible”, Shields asks, “that contemporary literary prizes are a bit like the federal bailout
package, subsidizing work that is no longer remotely describing reality?” Reality Hunger here echoes Barthes’s
(2009, p. 160) notion of “writing as the signifier of the literary myth”, the “revolt” against which must be “a murder
of Literature”. The question of what nonfiction’s role might be in this refusal is one of the manifesto’s
preoccupations.

The deceptive surface and the receptive surface
This violent rhetoric of “dissection and explosion”, “dismemberment” of language and its mediums (Lydenberg
1978, p. 415) comes from an historical moment when the Russian revolution was an event still within living
memory of avant-gardists and political philosophers. As the twentieth century progressed, this rhetoric of textual
violence was maintained alongside a critical “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Nuttall 2012, p. 410), which also holds
that the text is in need of opening and excavating in order to access ‘deeper’ ideological truths. Both these artistic
and critical methods rely on an oppositional dialectic between surface and depth in which “what is evident,
perceptible and apprehensible … what is neither hidden nor hiding” (Best & Marcus 2009, p. 9) is derivative or
deceptive, and secondary to what is ‘underneath’. Both Marxism and Freudianism, the key theoretical
metalanguages underlying such methods, hold that what is literal and evident is only ‘a symptom’ of deeper systems
and forces that require interpretation to be fully seen and understood. In the critical methodology of “symptomatic
reading” (p. 3), the critic ‘decodes’ the ostensible presentation of a text to find what is “hidden, repressed, deep and
in need of detection and disclosure” (p. 1). Jameson’s The Political Unconscious (1981, quoted in Best & Marcus
2009, pp. 1–2) famously argued that relations of power are embedded in all cultural texts, and operating covertly.
The critical reader could never assume that “the text means just what it says” because “if everything were
transparent then no ideology would be possible and no domination either”.
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But as Nuttall notes (2012, p. 409), alongside this powerful political, philosophical and literary tradition of thought,
in the twenty-first century new theoretical perspectives are emerging that consider the surface differently. It is not
just a cover, but sometimes a “generative force” of its own upon which different modalities of knowing and
becoming are at work. This is not an either/or proposition, this idea of the surface does not deny or dismiss what we
know can be repressed according to the insights of symptomatic thinking. It is a broadening of the critical lens.
Nuttall (2014, p. 165) proposes a “more horizontal secular reading” that is “spliced” with insights derived from
symptomatic thinking that informs “a present shaped … by a difficult past”. Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus (2009,
p. 13) find that what one can learn from surfaces resonates with a Foucauldian perspective that might seek “to make
visible what is invisible only because it’s too much on the surface of things”. Also after Foucault, Kosofsky
Sedgwick (2003, pp. 12–13) questions the “pseudodichotomy between repression and liberation” inherent in these
‘heroic’ critical and artistic methodologies, noting that it risks politics and relations becoming “reactive and
bifurcated”. Our politics and choices “narrow to accepting or refusing … this or that … dramatizing only the
extremes of compulsion and voluntarity”. For Kosofsky Sedgwick (p. 17) it is the “middle ranges of agency” that
offer new spaces for considering something different. She proposes the surface modality of “texture” as one site for
exploring this. By bringing our attention to what is material, what has breadth and length, what can be touched and
felt, we might shift the emphasis of our critical questions.

We can look here to A Little White Shadow (Ruefle 2006) to see how contemporary poet Mary Ruefle’s practice of
“erasure” approaches the surface of the page and the materiality of the text with such an inflection. Like methods of
cutting, erasure is an act of discursive disobedience that allows the text to “[break] free of the past” (Cooney 2014,
p. 16), but without quite the same revolutionary zeal and violent overtones we see in Höch’s photomontage. Ruefle
(2010, p. 4) who is one of the most well-known practitioners of erasure, describes it simply as “using pages of one
book to make another book”. Ruefle’s (2010, p. 3) material process is a fleshy encounter with language, working on
erasure with white-out she describes “the sense I was somehow blinding” or “blindfolding” the words, “bandaging
the words”, leaving those that “seeped out”, but it is not a gesture of violence. The surface here is not in need of
such an assault. The text arrives already freed of its ostensible discourse in ‘fields’ of poetic associations. As she
describes it (p. 5), “words rise above the page, by say an eighth of an inch, and hover there in space, singly and
unconnected, and they form a kind of field, and from this field I pick my words as if they were flowers”. A Little
White Shadow is a colour-printed chapbook of 42 pages that erases the original text of an obscure Victorian novel
using correction fluid. The source text is not one of literature’s great works, it is simply “an old book” (Ruefle 2010,
p. 4). We learn from the inclusion of the source text’s dedication page, that it was written “In memory of E.B.M.
who died February 14th, A.D. 1874” and that it was “Published for the Benefit of a Summer Home for Working
Girls” (Ruefle 2006, n.p.). Immediately these details situate it within historical discourses of femininity and
‘women’s literature’, which it proceeds to play with. We note already in the dedication page the tragic-romantic date
of poor E.B.M.’s death on Valentine’s Day, as well as its evocation of female confinement in the ‘Summer Home’.
The first three words on the following page, “one in ruins” (p. 3), strike an associative note here, the social ‘ruin’
perhaps befalling the ‘one’ who ended up in the Summer Home. The female pronoun continues to appear as the text
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proceeds, evoking these discourses. “The/ number blue/ encircled herself” (p. 4), “I had been sketching/ tall pink
heather/ her hat being the only thing moving” (p. 14). Wherever ‘she’ is, it is not such a happy place as “seven
centuries of/ sobbing/ gathered/ in the/ twilight” (p. 8), the melancholy of “autumn/ had no particular talents but/
genius”. Alongside these feminine figures, who we might imagine are “pale, and/ deformed but very interesting” (p.
23), are strange companions such as the servant who “seemed to be a/ lady in/ quaint/ de Medici costume,/ resting
on soft/ red cushions/ partially/ covered with hands” (p. 19). Or “the flapping white/ dresses of the fish/ rising
sharply against the sky” (p. 17).
In Best and Marcus’s (2009, p. 9) rubric of methods and sites for “surface reading”, they nominate “surface as
materiality” as one of these locations. Enquiry into the history of the book for instance, “attends to the literal surface
of books themselves, making signs inseparable from their material supports”. A Little White Shadow attends to
surface as materiality in this way, but with quite a different
intention. The material surface of the text is attended to here to
create what Cooney (2014, p. 18) has called a ‘palimpsestic’
erasure. Cooney finds that erasures can be categorised into two
types: “complete” erasure that entirely effaces the source work,
and the “palimpsest” that uses typographical gestures such as
crossing out, bolding or pasting over the source text. The
palimpsest uses the material surface of the text to signify a
temporal dimension, that “suggest[s] visually that … the ground
can never be cleared of the prior”. A Little White Shadow is a
palimpsestic erasure that builds materially on the surface of the
source text to create temporal layers through which the work’s
poetics move. Ruefle’s uneven strokes of correction fluid sit
chemically white against the yellow pages of the old book as
seen in Figure 12, creating an image of the past and the present
within the same textual space. Both the source text and the new
Figure 12 An image of page 5 of A Little White
Shadow (2006) by Mary Ruefle

text are present and partial on each page—as word and as
image—each disrupting the other. The old and new move

within each other, signifying the permeability of the text and contingency of its discourses.
Returning to Kosofsky Sedgwick here, A Little White Shadow’s surface materiality is highly textural. The chapbook
is printed in high-resolution colour that shows every daub, blot and brushstroke of white-out on the page. Even if we
can’t immediately feel the rough bumpiness of the layers of correction fluid, we can imagine them in the detail of
their image. The visual speaks of the textural and brings our attention to the material surface of the page. Kosofsky
Sedgwick (2003, p. 17) proposes that attentiveness to the textural surface shifts the emphasis of questions we ask
about the performative text toward those of “phenomenology and affect”. Instead of asking whether or not there are
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essential truths and authentic realities and how we can or cannot know them, we might ask “what motivates
performativity … and what individual and collective effects are mobilized in [its] execution”. It is tempting to say
here that what is mobilised on A Little White Shadow’s surface materiality is a playful delight. Through attending to
the material surfaces of the text, a space is created for spontaneity and surprise, a weaving and darting of
signification that is light and playful—but still sharp. The darting manoeuvres of a swallow come to mind here.
There is a ludic pleasure in reading that is similar to but more delicate than the savage humour of Höch’s
photomontage. What value might this kind of delight have for questions of how we read and negotiate the past? And
ourselves? Is it possible to delight in the passing of a life through the play of the text? Ruefle (2010, p. 7) finds all of
life “is much, much more than is necessary, and much, much more than any of us can bear”, we ourselves are “an
erasure of everything we have forgotten or don’t know or haven’t experienced”. Can we delight in the play of our
own erasure? Can we attend to the textures and layers of our knowing as they come and go, instead of trying to hang
on, fix them in place, or refuse them outright?

Autobiographical surface acts
A Little White Shadow can be placed within a rubric of women’s artistic practice working at the interface of the
word and the image. Smith and Watson (2002, p. 3) find female artists frequently working at this interface in
autobiographical practice “expand[ing] the modes of self-representation at a shifting matrix of visuality and
textuality”. Like Cooney’s observation about modes of poetic erasure, Smith and Watson find palimpsestic layering
to be one of the key ways that female artists “texture the interface” (p. 21). The palimpsestic autobiographical
interface “animates surfaces with cultural residue” (p. 28). One layer lies submerged, “apparently erased or over
written by a second image”, but traces “leak through”. The autobiographical palimpsest creates textual and textural
layers, through which the autobiographical subject can be written through “disparate histories, images, identities, all
coexisting in the same space” (31).
Approaching my own autobiographical enquiry and the terror, and anger, and love, and sheer confusion that is all
part of my relationship with my mother and my illness, frequently and often desperately, I have reached for these
mixed modalities of text and image. I need these textual layers in order to come anywhere near this territory. I need
a biographical word that I can inhabit and slip away from. I need an historical image I can situate and then cut away.
I need textures of feeling as well as truths. For Smith and Watson (2002, p. 16) the literary-visual interface is a site
where women artists have “queried the significance of mimesis” and confronted “easy ‘historical’ and ‘biographical’
accuracy” in autobiographical acts. The quest for self-knowledge can be situated “somewhere between exposure and
disguise” in moves that both “reveal and conceal” the subject, “enacting the tension between assertion and denial of
self”. By incorporating the “rich dimension of space” (Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003, p. 9) and the palimpsestic interface
into my autobiographical enquiry, the past becomes something I can side-step, duck under, jump over, pull up close
to and then hold at arm’s length. And then instead of imploding under the pressure of how to write this story of
being ill, I am playing between, within these layers. My anger, my anxiety becomes joyful through the pleasure of
material making of myself on the page. Like the Barthesian amphibology (2010, p. 72) that to be “against” means to
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resist and to refuse, but it also means to “press against” my refusal has softened, become attentive to the textures of
my own feelings. I find room to move in this space opened on the page.
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Writing the unthinkable: anxiety, lyric essay and poetic language
Always, when I try to write this part, when I go to write about anxiety directly, a fogginess rises in my head. A
welling of emotion turns into some kind of block—
dizziness now
pressure behind my eyes my ears feel hot

When I try to look at it squarely, it is always like this—

a tightening across my forehead
dizziness
a feeling of seizing-up woolly stuffing in the head

Some palpable energetic blockage arises. When I try to write about my anxiety (it is like this, intimate, unique,
mine) I am always leaving spaces where words do not come. Gaps on the page and blocks of white space—

related also, I think, is my addiction to the em-dash—

Why does this happen? Why, when I try to write my anxiety do I lose language? And how do I write something I
can’t seem to access?
I could make up a neat narrative about this, I could read a lot of text books and string together something coherent
about what experts say, I could write flowing sentences, but I would not really be writing my anxiety. I would be
closing it off through language, repressing that which wishes to be seen.
What wishes to be seen? That’s the thing I can’t really put into words, I lose language when I try. I’m always leaving
big gaps on the page where the words don’t come—

85

—I’m thinking of the thing that D’Agata (2014) suggests “we might as well call” the lyric essay, as a way
to write this “unthinkable” (Winnicott 1974, p.89) terror that is before, outside, in excess of language. The lyric
essay “emphasizes what is unknown”, accumulates meaning from “intensity of rhythm and feeling” (Miller & Paola
2012, p. 147), progresses through “juxtaposition or sidewinding poetic logic” (Tall & D’Agata 1997, p. 8). It is a
form that we might say uses the embodied poetics of the Kristevan “semiotic”, those “rhythms and tones that are
meaningful parts of language and yet do not represent or signify something” (Oliver 2002, ‘Introduction’ para. 10).

Anxiety is not a strong enough word here
I come across Donald Winnicott’s famous essay ‘Fear of Breakdown’ one day when a book I’ve pulled off the shelf
in the State Library falls open, and Winnicott’s (1974, p. 87) striking turn of phrase leaps out of it: “My clinical
experiences have brought me recently to a new understanding, as I believe, of a fear of breakdown.” He goes on:
“Naturally, if what I say has truth in it, this will already have been dealt with by the world’s poets.” I am
immediately struck by this opening which not only pinpoints one of my most troubling symptoms, but does it in the
same breath as talking about its poetic truths. My deepest anxiety is an annihilating fear of coming apart. At my
worst moments, that will take a long, long time to recover from—months, sometimes years—I feel like I am at some
kind of threshold, beyond which is disaster: madness, incapacity, failure, collapse. A catastrophe of mind. This is my
anxiety.
In ‘Fear of Breakdown’, Winnicott collects his thoughts on this kind of fear which he says, is a “feature of
significance in some of our patients”(1974, p. 87). He theorises that the ‘breakdown’ that is feared, is actually not
something that might happen in the future, but something that has already happened in the past. It is a fear of
returning to an overwhelming trauma experienced by the infant in a pre-verbal state. Clinically speaking, this fear of
breakdown “is the fear of a breakdown that has already been experienced” (p. 90; italics in original). A “queer kind
of truth”, he calls it, “that what is not yet experienced did nevertheless happen in the past”.

I feel tightness rising across my head as I write this

I feel my throat constrict

As the leading figure in object-relations theory, Winnicott was most interested in infant and child development, and
how the environment of ‘objects’ (here this includes people such as the primary carer, mother, father) impacts the
formation of the emerging self. At the top of a list of psychic terrors that might be experienced by an unfortunate
infant whose “holding environment” of objects is unstable, it says: “From this chart it is possible to make a list of
Primitive Agonies”, then in parentheses, “(anxiety is not a strong enough word here)”. I read this and I think, that’s
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more like it. Primitive Agony; that’s is starting to touch the intensity of feeling that goes through me at my worst
moments. Anxiety is not a strong enough word; anxiety doesn’t begin to cover it.
now pressure is rising again behind my eyes
I wish I could cry, but it won’t come

the mind clouds over and I have to stop

This hot place
I have a distinct memory of the first episode of a confusing and terrifying psychic experience that has returned to me
again and again, and that still I can slip into sometimes if I’m not careful, if I allow my mind to remember—

sensation is welling

now I have to keep writing or the block will kick in

It must have happened when I was about five or six years old. I must have been this age because I was thinking
about my friend Susie, who I played with when I was in early primary school. As I lay in bed one night thinking
about her, I descended into panic and confusion. I suddenly couldn’t understand the difference between myself and
Susie. Lying there, I could picture her in my mind’s eye and I felt sure about who Susie was, but I couldn’t feel the
same certainty about myself. When I tried to reach for it, all I got was increasing panic and a lot of unpleasant
sensations—

something meaty (fleshy red)

something dry (biting a rock)
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distance and closeness to something (dark and hard)
unpleasant heat, closeness too close

Thinking about this now in psychoanalytic terms, it probably shows that at five or six years old, whatever I was, I
had not successfully negotiated the first stages of the path from being a flailing infant waving arms and legs through
my own frame of vision (whose legs? whose hands? the baby wonders) to an intact little person, who says ‘I am’
with confidence about what is me, and who is not. This crucial time in our infant lives when we have not “separated
out the ‘not-me’ from the ‘me’” as Winnicott (1974, p. 89) puts it, is the hot spot of so much psychoanalytic theory.

and now the tightness is rising it’s hard to write this

I remember my first psychiatrist used to say
“the image of you I get is of a baby without skin”

In the mid-twentieth century, Winnicott and the other towering figure in the field, Jacques Lacan, began placing an
emphasis on “the inaugural psychic process of becoming a subject or of developing a separate self” (Kirshner 2010,
p. 332). The question in which both were interested, in differing ways from each other and also from Freudian
theory, was how the boundaries of the conscious self are formed and constituted. While Winnicott was concerned
with infant development in relation to objects, Lacan tackled this question by considering how psychoanalytic
theories of the unconscious, and the ego, could be advanced through the application of philosophy and linguistics.
Lacan is well-known for proposing that the unconscious is structured like a language. Drawing on Saussure’s
deconstruction of language into signified, signifier and sign, Lacan posited that what is recognised as the self is not a
transcendental given, but rather constituted by a fraught relationship between what we see, imagine and feel to be
our ‘self’. Lacan brought a new perspective to Freud’s notion of the ego by introducing the subject (le sujet). The
Lacanian subject speaks through the ego but remains “irreducibly distinct from it” (Johnston 2018, n.p.) ultimately
“defying capture by and within ego-level identificatory constructs”.
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The Lacanian subject is located in language: it “is always, and essentially a speaking subject” (Kirshner 2010, p.
335). The Lacanian subject:
[decentres] the transcendental ego, cutting through it, and opening it up to a dialectic in which its syntactic
and categorical understanding is merely the liminary moment of the process, which is itself always acted
upon by the relation to the other dominated by the [Freudian] death drive and its productive reiteration of
the ‘signifier’.
(Kristeva 1984, p. 30)
It is this Lacanian insight that has made language so central to contemporary concepts of selfhood, and writing such
a potent site for its consideration. Especially because another insight that Lacanian theory has shown us is that this
constitution of the subject in language is not neutral. It is deeply implicated by social systems of power that are
themselves held within language.
In the ‘mirror phase’, the infant sees the self, reflected in an individual body that is unified and separate like adults
around him (Lacan’s is still the universal male subject). But the imago (the self in the mirror) is something quite
separate and different to the subjective feeling of the infant self, that is fragmented and humming with energies both
pleasurable and unpleasant. This split during the mirror stage posits the ego as an object (Johnston 2018, n.p.), the
subject then (which is the same self) is divided, like a linguistic sign, between the signifier (the representative
symbol, here the imago) and the signified (the concept, the feeling of the self). This divide cannot be surmounted, so
the Lacanian subject is always lacking, never to feel whole. For Lacan, the image of the self in the mirror becomes
the “prototype” for the “world of objects” (Lacan, quoted in Kristeva 1984, p. 46) through which the subject
recognises himself as separate (but always split, lacking). The feeling of the self that is alive with unformed psychic
and bodily energies identified with the maternal is rejected in the phase known as castration, when these energies are
sublimated and resolved in the realm of the Symbolic that imposes the social order. In Lacanian discourse, the
register of the Symbolic can be understood as “the customs, institutions, laws, mores, norms, practices, rituals, rules,
traditions, and so on of cultures and societies (with these things being entwined in various ways with language)”
(Johnston 2018, n.p.).
Psychoanalytic theory is a universe vast enough to spend a lifetime navigating, and most of it is beyond the scope of
my interest here. In fact, I confess that I have spent a lot of my writing life avoiding it. I am sure, this is because this
hot place is the seat of my anxiety. This place, where the psyche and the body make something real through
language, or where it comes apart in silent catastrophe is where I experience this primitive agony. Thinking deeply
about theories of subjectivity takes me to those moments where language utterly fails, my reality becomes just
searing sensation that I would put myself in front of a car, or cut open my own arm, in order to get away from it (I
have never tried, I am stoic in its throes). At these moments of intense interference right at the deep point of who I
am, the subject who is ‘me’ is occupying some threshold between the unified self—‘I am’ (see how

89

neat and collected it stands on the page) —and my disintegration into everything else. I am here but not here, I am
unstable (obviously). At these moments there is no language, I am only skin filled with terrible sensation.

this tightening across my head
stomach dropping—
a rush of blood through the face

And again, how do I write this?

Kristeva’s semiotics and poetic language
Julia Kristeva is particularly interested in the limits of language, “how the subject is constituted through language
acquisition, and how the subject is demolished with the psychotic breakdown of language” (Oliver 2002,
‘Introduction’, para. 14). For Kristeva, the regression of language during a psychotic break such as the collapse of
syntactical structures, repeating, humming, and disconnection with signifying systems of fact, is not a disturbance of
language, but rather, reveals the part of it that is repressed in the Symbolic register. In Lacanian discourse, that
which exists outside the patriarchal Symbolic order “remains unrepresentable” the spectre of its representability
being only the “spectre of psychosis” (Butler 1993, p. 70). As Butler helpfully describes it, Kristevan poetics
“redescribes and reinterprets what is ‘outside’ the symbolic as the semiotic” that is, as “a poetic mode of signifying
that, although dependent on the symbolic, can neither be reduced to it nor figured as its unthemetizable Other”.
In her work Revolution in Poetic Language (1984, p. 49), Kristeva explains the semiotic as a preverbal modality
“preceding meaning and signification, mobile, amorphous, but already regulated” by material processes of the body.
For Kristeva, the logic of language that Lacan theorised as structuring the unconscious is already operating before
the mirror stage and castration, in the material processes of the earliest infantile bodily relations. Language is not
just imposed through the patriarchal social order, but also exists in the semiotic register as material and embodied,
“something like the infinite displacement of that jouissance that is phantasmically identified with the maternal body”
(Butler 1993, p. 70). In this way, the Kristevan subject can be seen as quite different from Lacan’s, because it is
always already an embodied subject, that brings the “speaking body back into discourse” (Oliver 2002,
‘Introduction’, para. 17). Kristeva finds a place for a subject that exists in excess of the patriarchal modalities of
language, that is, the “well-ordered signifier” that is held “sacred and unalterable within the enclosure of the Other
(Kristeva 1984, p. 51). The Kristevan semiotic acts in a dialectic with a modality she names “the symbolic” (in a
different sense to Lacan’s Symbolic) which is “the structure or grammar that governs the ways in which symbols can
refer”. The oscillation between the semiotic and the symbolic is “what makes signification possible” (Oliver
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2002,’Introduction’ para. 13). “Without the symbolic element of signification, we have only sounds or delirious
babble. But without the semiotic element of signification, signification would be empty and we would not speak; for
the semiotic provides the motivation for engaging in signifying processes.”
Here, I think of the weird sensations that for me often accompany intense anxiety and panic—an unidentifiable
sense of dryness and hardness, heat, closeness (“a rock in my mouth”, I told my psychiatrist once). I also think of the
way new-born babies squirm, their little legs stretching, feet pointing and tongue poking, the energies that move
through them like waves from their feet to their raised eyebrows. I think of the physical sensations that block my
utterances when I go to write these hot places, the tingling in my legs and tightening across my head, stomach
dropping, bowels moving—these reactions being set off from lower body to upper body, through my arms and
fingers and energy coming through the face to the top of my head, my neck cracking as it does.

The genotext: writing embodied experience
Writing my anxiety is perhaps something like writing physical pain. Pain, as Mintz (2011, p. 243) finds, is a “bodily
event with no clear or inevitable ethology, definition, or description” that is also deeply subjective. Chronic pain, in
particular “pursues its own course, ever present but elusive”, it “interrupts the plot” of linear life narratives and
“makes us unrecognisable to ourselves”. The difficulty of capturing pain in language is no better expressed than in
the common medical metaphor of a ‘pain scale’. Few people who have visited a Western medical practitioner for
treatment of pain have left without being asked ‘how bad is it on a scale of one to ten?’ Eula Biss’s essay ‘The Pain
Scale’ (2007) untangles the notion that pain as a bodily experience can ever really be understood in such a linear and
scientific way. The essay wanders through thoughts, feelings, anecdotes and ideas arising from her subjective
experience which, at each stage of the scale confuse and often contradict the steadily escalating metaphor. The essay
begins at zero as we find the narrator “sitting in the exam room of a hospital entertaining the idea that absolutely no
pain is not possible” (p. 65). Here we encounter the first problem with the pain scale’s logic, “I need a zero”, the
narrator says. “A scale of any sort needs fixed points.” But a human body evacuated of all pain is an abstraction, just
like the concept of zero itself. The essay then hops deftly from the quotidian setting of the hospital waiting room to
the abstraction of maths and philosophy via a series of epithetical sentences:
Zero is not a number. Or at least, it does not behave like a number. It does not add, subtract, or multiply like
other numbers. Zero is a number in the way that Christ was a man.
Aristotle, for one, did not believe in Zero.
If no pain is possible, then, another question—is no pain desirable? Does the absence of pain equal the
absence of everything?
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Biss’s essay interrogates the ideas of a pain scale by using it as a structure and, questioning its logic against her own
experience as it progresses. At number 2, she cannot answer accurately when the doctor asks, “Do you have more or
less pain than the last time I saw you?” “Does she mean any pain in addition to the pain I already feel, or does she
mean any pain at all?” (p. 68) the narrator wonders. Pain can be intolerable or pleasurable at different points on the
scale, an “extraordinary pain” that swells under the hands of a therapist during treatment is “deeply pleasurable”, but
for another type of pain at number 7 on the scale, the narrator “would happily cut off a finger” (p. 79) in order to
trade it for lower-level chronic pain. By number 10 the narrator concludes that, “I have discovered that the pain I am
in is always the worst pain imaginable” (p. 84). She would “like to believe that there is an upper limit to pain” but
this idea only takes her back to abstraction, 10 relying as it does, on zero. The attempt to quantify maximum pain in
a number is perhaps as futile and absurd as developing an “Alternative Number System” that eliminates the need for
zero by replacing it with the character ‘A’, which, the essay tells us, a man called Robert Forslund actually tried to
do.
In Kristevan terms, the medical metaphor of the pain scale is a clear and present example of the limitations of the
phenotext (Kristeva 1984, p. 86) and how language in the symbolic register alone cannot fully signify an embodied
subjective experience. The Kristevan phenotext and genotext are present in all textual objects as a corollary of the
semiotic/symbolic dialectic within signification. The phenotext “is structured and grammatical; it makes
communication possible” (Oliver 2002, ‘Part 2: The Subject in Signifying Practice’, para. 3), while the genotext are
the threads in a text that are “spun by the drives and are woven within the semiotic disposition” (Roudiez 1984, p.
5). Biss’s essay might be said to restore the genotext to the concept of the pain scale by weaving, with its rhythms,
fragmented syntax and non-linear progression, an alternative logic of pain that is in excess of grammatical (and
scientific) ‘sense-making’. The genotext being of the body and allied “with woman” (Kristeva 1984, p. 29) has
historically been repressed. Designating the genotext:
… requires pointing out the transfers of drive energy that can be detected in phonetic devices (such as the
accumulation and repetition of phonemes or rhyme) and melodic devices (such as intonation or rhythm), in
the way semantic and categorial fields are set out in syntactic and logical features, or in the economy of
mimesis (fantasy, the deferment of denotation, narrative, etc.)
(Kristeva 1984, p. 86)
In the case of Western medical discourses of pain addressed by Biss’s essay, what is repressed is the essential
unknowability of pain as a subjective embodied experience. Although it is diagnosable as a symptom, or sometimes
can be pointed to in the spatial plane of the body, pain is also, finally, unverifiable. As such it is a “challenge to our
methods of saying and knowing” (Mintz 2011, p. 245). In Biss’s essay (2007, p. 72) the narrator’s father, a doctor
himself, confesses “One of the functions of the pain scale, is to protect doctors”, because hearing someone describe
their pain “as a ten” is easier than hearing them describe it as “a hot poker driven through their eyeball”. In her
incantation of “my pain”, “an extraordinary pain”, “my own pain” at each stage of the scale, that never serves to

92

finally explain or clarify the narrator’s pain, the phenotextual logic of the pain scale is revealed to be empty. As
“arbitrary as the numbers on a pain scale” pain is both a stubbed toe, or being “impaled with hundreds of nails”
(Mintz 2011, p. 251). And then there is “the pain of learning, and the pain of reading”, “the pain of trying”, “the pain
of living” (Biss 2007, p. 73).
Kristeva’s designation of the semiotic and the symbolic, and the corollary phenotext and genotext, arise from her
analysis of the works of Mallarmé, Joyce and Artaud, which a century ago showed that a writing doesn’t have to
‘makes sense’ in order to be intelligible. Kristeva (1984, p. 16) finds these works of modernist literature marked the
necessary “historical moment” in which social conditions “tolerate or necessitate that manifestation of the signifying
process in its ‘poetic’ or ‘esoteric’ form”. We in the twenty-first century continue in this moment, as writers of
illness and bodily difference, to search for ways to represent ourselves and our experiences outside the discourses of
medicine, the law or other systems of the social order (including the linear narratives of marketable memoir). The
genotextual Kristevan poetic is being explored, especially through the form known as ‘lyric essay’. Mintz (2011, pp.
245–6) finds that in its “associative juxtaposition and fragmentation” the lyric essay becomes “pain’s most suitable
autobiographical genre”, being able to “capture the movement of pain” in a form where “pain becomes affirming
rather than negating, an avowal of the self’s aliveness”.

The genotext, the lyric essay, and the ‘useful shapes’ of language
Claudia Rankine’s Don’t Let Me Be Lonely: An American Lyric (2017) is another work of ‘lyric essay’ that lends
itself to productive analysis through the lens of Kristevan poetics. This work is the first of a trilogy, including
Citizen (2015) and Just Us (2020), which examines race and culture, selfhood and subjectivity in contemporary
America. Don’t Let Me Be Lonely explores a concept of “ethical loneliness” that is described in an epigraphical
quote as “the isolation one feels when one, as a violated person or as a member of a persecuted group, has been
abandoned by humanity, by those who have power over one’s life” (n.p.). The body is explicit in Don’t Let Me Be
Lonely, and it is a conscious body that is thinking and feeling. “Have I ever vomited up love or coughed up blame?”
(p. 40) the narrator asks. Sometimes language arises directly from within the body, “a thought that was floating
around in your veins organises itself into a sentence that reflects it” (p. 127). In this work the body expresses what
the African American subject cannot speak. “I am not exactly a crying person” (p. 56), the narrator tells us, instead,
“I get a sharp pain in my gut”. This is especially in response to reports of police brutality: “I go into my bedroom to
put on socks because my toes could be cold and on the TV is Abner Louima”, a young black man who was
sodomised with a broken broomstick while in police custody. Or Amadou Diallo: “All the shots, all forty-one never
add up” (p. 57). The narrator feels these losses “to the point of being bent over each time”. “The world moves
through words as if the bodies the words reflect did not exist”, the narrator tells us in another stanza. “The world,
like a giant liver, receives everyone and everything, including these words: Is he dead? Is she dead? The words
remain an inscription on the surface of my loneliness” (p. 129).
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Don’t Let Me Be Lonely is highly irregular in its syntax and poetic logic, and particularly interesting in its use of the
image/text interface as part of semiotic language. “Or, well, I tried to fit language into the shape of usefulness” (p.
129), the narrator tells us. Don’t Let Me Be Lonely might be well described as a writer wrestling with language in
order to find a ‘shape’ to express a lived experience that cannot be written in the ‘useful’ phenotextual modes of
language. What is repressed here by the social order and its conventional modes of signification is African American
subjectivity. Viewed through the lens of Kristevan poetics, we can see that the indeterminacy of Don’t Let Me Be
Lonely’s genre and form is intimately connected to its profound enquiries into race and American culture. The
narrator could be autobiographical, but then transgresses this assumption and its ‘pact’. The “I” who “was switched
from Prozac to fluoxetine” (p. 53), just a few lines later and in the same sentence, slides into the third person,
becoming a recollection of something said by someone else. The “we” who are “having lunch” in this same
anecdote, “because I am writing a book on hepatotoxicity” (italics added), at first seems to be the same first-person
narrator whose sister, in the next section, has lost her daughter and son in a car accident. Later this sister is referred
to as “my sister, this character” (p. 123), who wakes with night sweats and is then immediately in dialogue with the
first-person narrator again in the literary present. The subject position is openly questioned by the narrator: “Is ‘I’
even me or am ‘I’ a gearshift to get from one sentence to the next?”, they ask. “Should I say we? Is the voice not
various if I take responsibility for it? What does my subject mean to me?” (p. 54).
‘Useful’ language is the kind that can be used to sell books. The narrator, who is writing a book about the liver is
asked by an editor to explain “what the liver means to me” (p. 54). But the narrator can’t answer the question in the
way they know the editor wants—that can be used in “ad copy”. They try to fit language into the ‘useful’ symbolic,
but instead can only speak using the embodied, beating, feeling, bleeding register of the semiotic: “but how can I say
to her, Understand without effort that man is left, at times thinking, as if trying to weep”. Some passages of Don’t
Let Me Be Lonely read like the passing thoughts writers are supposed to strain themselves to sharpen and clarify. “In
a taxi speeding uptown on the West Side Highway” (p. 89), the narrator says, “I let my thoughts drift” and delivers
them directly on to the page:
It finally occurs to me that feelings fill the gaps created by the indirectness of experience. Though the
experience is social, thoughts carry it into a singular space and it is this that causes the feelings of
loneliness; or it is this that collides the feeling with the experience so that what is left is the solitude called
loneliness.
The reader is forgiven for finding themselves thinking ‘what?’ Specific grammatical and narrative logic is missing.
We are not sure exactly what “experience” it is that is “social”, and what exactly “this” is that refers somehow to
“thoughts” carrying “it” into a “singular space”. These unrefined ideas that gesture toward, but do not clearly
capture the precise thing that they mean, appear throughout the text. There is a sense of feeling like you’re not
‘getting it’. But within this miscommunication, which feels like a frustration of meaning, lies this sense of “ethical
loneliness”.
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The genotext can be thought of as “a space that can be mapped in a topology” (Oliver 2002, ‘Part 2: The Subject in
Signifying Practice’, para. 3) Idiosyncratic use of space and imagery also textures this work, and no two pages of
Don’t Let me Be Lonely are alike in their layout. Its eighteen stanzas are marked by eighteen right-hand pages which
are blank except for a black and white image of a TV in the bottom right corner. Between these, each stanza
combines words, images and space in different ways. For instance, the second last stanza is eleven pages long and
begins with an anecdote about talking to a stranger at a bus stop about the Iraq war. This covers two thirds of the
page in prose (Figure 13). The rest of the page is
left blank. The following page juxtaposes a new
fragment in a six-line paragraph at the top of the
page, followed by an uncredited snapshot of an
American flag above a banner saying SUPPORT
OUR TROOPS. Again, the rest of the page is left
blank (Figure 14).
Irregular spatial features further disrupt the
conventions of language and reading that are
being questioned in this text. The visual—which
here includes the space of the blank page—and
textual run parallel with their different
vocabularies working to “gesture toward a

Figure 13 An image of page 113 of Don’t Let Me Be Lonely (2017) by
Claudia Rankine

subjectivity neither can exhaustively articulate”
(Smith & Watson 2002, pp. 21–22). The
“interface” of image and text is “relational”,
“parallel or interrogatory juxtaposition” that
“disrupts the seeming coherence of [a] … subject”
and foregrounds “disparate voices, discourses,
identities, and desires”. Dialogues, dreamscapes,
news reports, and observations collide with
vernacular imagery such as street signage,
medicine labels, drawings, news imagery, and
instructional diagrams. Various rhetorical textures
combine leaving the reader in quiet lacunas. These
gaps and pauses give a sense of something being

Figure 14 An image of pages 114 and 115 of Don’t Let Me Be Lonely
(2017) by Claudia Rankine

held in between utterance and in this space, the
‘ethical loneliness’ of the African American subject arises again.
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The body, the lyric, poetics for writing my anxiety
“Breathe.”
My psychiatrist always tells me to breathe. I’m sitting across from him looking at the cork coasters on the table
between us, like I always do when I’m trying to avoid his eye. There’s a terrible tightness in my chest and across my
forehead and an intolerable weight.
“Breathe,” he says again as we sit across from each other not talking.
“Where do you feel it in your body?”
I have been in psychotherapeutic relationships almost all of my adult life. As a result, there are many stories I could
put together about my anxiety, where it comes from—whose fault it might be. That weird sensation of the rock in
my mouth? This is quite plausibly my mother’s breast (I realised years after I named the feeling). There was
confusion and conflict between my mother and my father that would have impacted me as an infant, and my mother
suffered quite severe post-natal depression. The emotional stress of this family setting explains a lot,
psychoanalytically, about why I was left feeling, literally, so unsure of my ‘self’. There are narratives I could string
together from psychoanalytic insights, but I would not really be writing my anxiety. I would, rather, be closing it off
through language, repressing that which wishes to be seen. I have learned to let go of the ‘why?’ questions that drive
linear narratives and the logic of ‘useful’ language. I have learnt to feel my anxiety rather than speak it.
I turn to the possibility of the lyric and Kristevan poetics as a way to write my anxiety as an ‘unthinkable’ psychic
experience, something that I have come to know only as sensation. It is something that comes from my body, and
can only be expressed (survived) through a breath. I exhale it. Through associative logic, pauses, gaps, the
image/text interface and spaces on the page I can access these primitive agonies. I use these poetics in a mode that
does not reach for poetry as literature but rather, as “an activity that liberates the subject from a number of linguistic,
psychic and social networks”, that “grants … the unique possibility of studying the becoming of the significations of
signs” (Kristeva, quoted in Roudiez 1984, p. 3). This is how I write my anxious self, as a subject becoming,
breathing: “Maybe hope is the same as breath—part of what it means to be human and alive” (Rankine 2017, p.
119).
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So That I Might Know Anxiety
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Appalling fear as I wait for Thai takeaway on a Monday night. Hair-trigger
panic. I stare at the menu-board but I’m not sure if I can read, or speak or
order takeaway food. It might be the thing that finally breaks me open. I am
existing here in this moment somehow, jangling and twitching from pills and
pills, on top of pills. There’s no relief, except maybe jumping in front of a car
on the way home, or cutting open my skin to let this feeling out (I never do
this but I understand why others do).
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Or put it this way, in the words of Søren Kierkegaard (whose insights arose
from his own torment), “And no Grand Inquisitor has such frightful
torments in readiness as has anxiety, and no secret agent knows as cunningly
how to attack the suspect in his weakest moment, or to make so seductive
the trap in which he will be snared; and no discerning judge understands
how to examine, yes, examinate, the accused as does anxiety, which never
lets him go, not in diversion, not in noise, not at work, not by day, not by
night.”
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The winter weather is good. My GP keeps saying “expose your arms” for the
Vitamin D. I sit in the sun at my local café with my sleeves pushed up.
A woman walks purposefully past me, and I get a flash in my own body of all
the energies she is holding in hers; actions, intentions, decisions. Movements
through the matrix of neurons and tendons and nerves that all fire off when
you hold it together in this life.
I can’t hold anything. My matrix is busted.
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One day I notice a woman who is anxious in a completely different way to
me. She stands next to her table, and watches while the waitress wipes it
down. Then she wipes it down again herself, with a serviette, and calls the
waitress back over to wipe down the seat. Her coffee comes and is set down
on the table, but still she cannot sit. She paces around looking at the coffee
and the seat, trying to find a way into the situation.
This is not me. It is not this table or this teapot that I am worried about.
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fears of being overwhelmed
destroyed
abandoned
mortified
mutilated
suffocated or drowned
of intolerable feeling states
losing mental
physical
or bodily control
of going insane
dissolving or being absorbed
invaded or shattered
of exploding
melting
leaking out
evaporating
or fading away—
encyclopaedia.com describes “annihilation anxieties” as those that involve “a
threat to psychic survival, experienced as a present menace or as an
anticipation of an imminent catastrophe.”
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In the bathroom, a sticker on the toilet roll holder says Brave Face.
I suppose it’s the name of a band.
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The first task of the day is to take six kinds of medicines and supplements:
10mg of escitalopram for anxiety and depression, 200mg of carbamazepine
for mood stabilisation, 1000mg of an amino acid called N-Acetyl Cysteine
that my doctor says will be good for my brain at the moment, a teaspoon of
high-strength, fruit-punch-flavoured fish oil (Omega-3s again for brain and
mood), and vitamin B complex and biomagnesium powder for nervous
system strength and repair.
I do this while I steam quinoa grain in a small saucepan for breakfast.
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There will be an appointment to go to. The psychiatrist, or the GP, or the
osteopath, or the Traditional Chinese therapist. I believe in a complementary
approach to my recovery and ongoing wellbeing.
—two sessions ten days apart, and then repeat in another three weeks
—every week except for, say, the usual public holidays when I do not go
—a yoga practice that works with rest and visualisation
—how are you sleeping?
—where are you in your cycle?
—send blood to the brain
—try to stay with that
—you’re doing well
—keep doing what you are doing
—well done
A friend said to me, “You rationalise your illness as wellness but it is an
anxious rationalisation nonetheless.”
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My therapist covers me with a thick, heavy towel, folding it at the waist to
keep my back exposed. She massages the ridges of my spine and then digs
into the tension across my shoulders and neck. She pinches my sternum and
blood jumps to the skin. “Heart heat,” she says.
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I don’t know when I got so good at this work of being unwell (well I do
know, but I didn’t realise this expertise I was honing).
There is some question about whether this is what I want to do now. There is
some question about whether I am going to recover this time, or whether I am
just going to keep sitting here with the sun on my arms, getting better at
being sick.
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I want the wrong things
I can’t have what I want
what I want makes me anxious
I will always be anxious
I will never be happy
I can’t have what I want
what I want makes me anxious
I will always be anxious
I will always be sick
I can’t live without drugs
I can’t stop taking drugs
I will develop an irreversible facial tic from taking antipsychotic drugs
I must not take these drugs
I have to take drugs
My feelings are wrong
I’ve done the wrong thing
I will never get it right
I’ll never succeed
I will always break down
I can’t have what I want
what I want makes me anxious
I will never be happy
Temazepam
Lorazepam
Diazepam
Alprazolam
Zopiclone
Zolpidem
(if you have to split a pill and it tastes bitter, cover it in a dab of toothpaste)
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There are two images I remember from watching television late at night
from my parents’ laps. One is a black and white photo of a woman
masturbating on the wing of a Cadillac, and the other is a shot of a
scientist lifting the jowl of an Alsatian, to show saliva collecting in a little
tube. I remember these two images vividly. Now I know what they both
are, I wonder, why was I awake watching documentaries about
Pavlovian behavioural conditioning and Helmut Newton’s erotic
photography? When have I not been an insomniac?
But then, kids often don’t sleep. Perhaps I’ve just never come to terms
with the things that keep children awake. This is very possible.
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The pathophysiology is uncertain but disturbances in the neurotransmission
of serotonin, 5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT), noradrenaline, gammaaminobutyric acid (GABA), cholecystokinin and corticotropin-releasing
factors may all be important.
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Much of what we know about behavioural psychology began with Ivan
Pavlov cutting holes in dogs’ necks.
Pavlov’s first dogs had fistulas cut into their throats so that when they ate, the
food would fall out as they swallowed. He would then collect the dogs’ gastric
juices from another hole cut into their stomachs. Pavlov was actually studying
the dogs’ digestive system when he famously noticed that they would salivate
at the sound of a bell.
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I’ve done the wrong thing
I’ve said the wrong thing
I am wrong
my feelings are wrong
I don’t want my feelings
I don’t want to be wrong
I have done the wrong thing
I’ve got to try harder
it’s all my fault
I am a failure
this is too much
my feelings are wrong
it is my fault
I cannot cope
I’ve done the wrong thing
I cannot cope
these feeling are wrong
I’m wrong
I don’t want to be wrong
I cannot cope
I must not fail
I am a failure
it’s all my fault
it’s happening again
my feelings are wrong
I must not fail
it’s happening again
these feelings are wrong
I don’t want these feelings
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The Cognitive Behavioural theory is that panic is mediated by catastrophic
interpretations of the sensations of anxiety (‘I am losing my mind’) and its
consequences (‘I will lose everything’, ‘I am a failure’). These catastrophic
narratives sustain high levels of anticipatory anxiety that increase sensitivity
to further cues, intensifying the next cycle of anxiety sensations and
catastrophic thinking.
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Put a dog in a metal stall and electrify the floor while you sound a buzzer.
Give the dog a low barrier to jump over to retreat from the electric shock.
When it retreats, electrify the floor on this side of the stall, and watch it jump
back over the barrier to the side which is now neutral. Now switch off the
electricity and just use the buzzer. Watch the dog jump back and forth over
the barrier at the sound of the buzzer, to the point of exhaustion, never
stopping to find out the floor is not electrified anymore.
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The Zoloft has been a misadventure. I wake up at 4.30am and that’s it, I lie in
bed for an hour and a half and then I get up and run a bath because I’m so
wretched.
Try Lexapro, they said.
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You must walk until you almost fall over.
When I feel like just stepping out the door will be the end of me, I will walk
for at least one hour. I’ll hold my fingers in a mudra I saw on a statue of a
Buddha in Vietnam—ring finger held by the thumb, and the middle finger,
pinkie and index fingers extended straight.
Then I’ll walk, steadily, feeling the slight structuring tension up through my
arms and across my shoulders.
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Quetiapine (brand name Seroquel) is an antipsychotic tranquiliser that has
been described as the ‘Swiss Army knife’ of psychopharmacology, but is only
subsidised in Australia for treatment of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.
In Australian Prescriber December 2015, Dr Alan Garrity defends the practice
of off-label prescribing for anxiety and sleep disturbance, noting that “offlabel use remains an important tool in certain clinical situations”.
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I have come to know something about anxiety and it is this—part of me clings
to this crippling fear. Even as I do everything I can to avoid it and supress it,
and heal it, I cling to it. I tend it.
There is a question: why would someone be plagued by thoughts and feelings
she cannot get rid of, if at some level she did not desire them?
Do you know what I mean?
Kierkegaard: “while anxiety fears, it maintains a subtle communication with
its object, cannot look away from it, indeed will not”.
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‘Half-life’ is a drug term that refers to the time it takes for the potency of a
substance to reduce by half in the body. All pharmaceuticals have a ‘half-life’.
Sometimes I call this sick, anxious life my ‘half-life’.
The Shaman says, “What happens to the other half? Where does it go?”
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“I had a dream about you,” I tell The Shaman.
“It was not here in your rooms, it was somewhere with a back yard. There
were two crazy bicycles with very elongated frames. They both had a very
small seat on a long pole, and handlebars very far away from the wheels. You
gave me one to ride but I was scared, because it was really high off the
ground and there was so little to hold on to. I didn’t really want to ride it, also
because it seemed like something that was precious to you, but you were just
laughing, saying ‘go, go ahead’. I was scared. It was really, really hard to
balance on.”
The Shaman says, “You ride your bike to appointments don’t you?”
“Yes,” I say.
“Well, I don’t think that needs much interpretation.”
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The Shaman’s rooms are in a draughty old terrace north of the city. There’s
no one else in the building, just him and Joy, his grumpy receptionist and all
of us filing in every day for our healing. He’s a doctor, a therapist, a sweary
silver-haired healer. I follow him down the hallway to the front room where
we sit facing each other on two soft grey leather couches.
The Shaman puts my file on his knee, glances over it, and says:
“So, how are you?”
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We talk about something we have come to call The Worst Feeling In The
World, because I don’t know what it is ‘about’, I only know it makes me want
to die.
“It's back,” I say.
“Ah, good!” He raises his eyebrows and smiles.
I start crying.
“Breathe,” he says.
I take a deep breath.
“Look,” he says, “you've got more colour in your face now.”
“Do I?”
“Yes, you do. I can see things changing in you that you can't see.”
“Oh.”
A word comes to me that appeared yesterday as I crouched on the bathroom
floor at work sobbing.
“Despair,” I say.
“Ah,” he nods, “utter hopelessness.”
I blow my nose again.
“It's so strange,” I tell him. “I was doing so well. I was feeling so —”I snap my
fingers “so clear, like a radio that had hit the right frequency. And then I
started to wonder, where's it all gone? Where’s all the anxiety gone?”
“So you summoned it.”
“I suppose.”
“And here it is.”
I wipe away more tears.
“And now every fibre of your being wants to get rid of this feeling. But isn't it
interesting, you are drawn to it too. Isn't that interesting,” he smiles again.
“I feel like dying,” I tell him.
“But that feeling moves,” he says. “Observe its movement.”
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Anxiety wants stories, The Shaman always says, anxiety needs stories.
“Stop feeding it,” he says.
“Anxiety is nothing really, it has no content unless you give it some.”
“Where do you feel it in your body?” he always asks me.
“Come back to sensations, this is where you will find more useful
information.”
I feel tightness across my forehead.
Thick heaviness between my ears and across my face.
My mouth is dry.
I feel a weight on my chest and pain up the sides of my neck.
I feel something close and uncomfortable, unpleasant, something hot, cloying.
The Shaman says, “That’s interesting.”
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In the middle of the day I walk around a city lake.
People seem to be stopped intermittently in unusual tableaux. One is staring
gently but intently at a tree, another is cross legged on the ground leaning
their head against a mossy stump.
I feel their slowness and their aloneness as I pass.
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What of this idea—that if I find the courage to look at this terror squarely,
really face it, and understand it, that freedom lies in this seeing.
Kierkegaard said anxiety is like this, it is “a warning” of the possibility of
existential freedom. “Freedom’s possibility announces itself in anxiety,” he
wrote in his work The Concept of Anxiety in 1884. “Consequently, a warning
may bring an individual to succumb to anxiety… although of course the
warning was intended to do the opposite.”
“He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy.”
What if it is this that keeps drawing me to the edge of myself.
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Sure-foot walking therapy: go somewhere expansive where there’s space to
walk a steady line without colliding with anything. Find a good rhythm and
once you’ve got it, close your eyes and walk for a short time without stopping.
Feel the steadiness of your steps and the rhythm of your stride.
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Even though Kierkegaard is a romantic favourite of the internet these days,
I’m not talking pop-psychological banalities here.
I remember once seeing a news report about a young guy who was
quadriplegic. He lived in a home where he got 24-hour nursing care. He had
ended up like this by drink-driving, and getting caught, and having his
licence suspended, and doing it again until he finally broke his own neck. But
in this news story, he said something like, “I’m much better now. I’m happier
now.” In the relief I heard in his voice, I understood something. I understood
that he had done this to himself so he wouldn’t have to meet his own life. The
grief of paralysis was less than the terror of living.
This is the intensity of it.
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Why do some anxious people get well and other people don’t get well? Is it a
choice?
“Well if it is, I certainly can’t make it for you. I can’t prescribe it. I can’t make
you do it,” The Shaman says.
Yes, but what is it?
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Anxiety’s possibility appears to us in a sudden existential moment that
Kierkegaard refers to as “the qualitative leap” (or just ‘the leap’). It is
qualitative because it has no place in logic, does not arise from any continuity
of reason or time.
Like I can’t think, or talk my way out of this anxiety, or make sense of it in
stories that never explain it but only make it worse, or medicate it away,
anxiety’s possibility comes only from a quiet stillness arising within the terror.
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Kierkegaard: “This spring in the leap, reminding one of the leap of the bird of
prey and of the wild beast, which doubly terrify because they commonly leap
from a completely motionless position, has an infinite effect.”
“Everything depends on anxiety coming into view.”
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“Anxiety is particular because it can be very, very intense, but it can also
disappear, or transform spontaneously given the right moment.”
“And what kind of moment is that?”
“This is the thing. I can’t tell you that, I can only tell you that it is possible.
You can only tend the garden. You can’t snap your fingers and make
whatever it is you want in it to appear.”
“Thanks for the metaphor.”
“You’re welcome.”
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“I’ve had enough,” I tell The Shaman.
I want to leave, I am so beyond tired. I want him to say ok, yes we can stop,
but he doesn’t.
“I know,” he says, “this session is hard.”
“It’s so hard,” I cry. “It’s harder every time.”
“I feel so lonely,” I tell him.
“You are alone,” he says.
“Breathe,” he tells me. “Stay with it.”
“Fuck,”
“Stay with it,”
“I can’t do this.”
“Yes you can. You’re doing it now. You’re doing it as we speak.”
“I can’t,” I tell him “I can’t live like this.”
“Like what?’” he asks me.
“In bits,” I tell him, “everything’s in bits.”
“How big are they?” The Shaman asks me.
“Are they heavy or light? Can you pick them up?”
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Breakthroughs happen like this. An unbearable tension builds up that opens
into a flood of shocking anxiety, and in the wash up I get a glimpse of clarity.
And there it is again.
A shattering feeling, anxiety, confusion and something hidden deeply being
exposed to the light.
And then tears come, and keep coming, sobbing comes from somewhere deep
and I cry and cry.
“I was in a cafe,” I tell him.
“You're always in cafes,” The Shaman says.
“It was in the pit of my gut. I saw it, I felt this clenched fist right in
the centre of my body, hanging on for dear life, and seeing it suddenly
released something.”
“For a while,” he says. “And when it comes back, you’ll know it better.”
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Quests and chaos: from illness memoir to existential essaying
The urge to write is never more visceral than when it is motivated by pain, illness and trauma. Frank (1995, pp. 53–
55) sees illness writing as intimately bound up with reclaiming the self from the “narrative wreckage” that an
episode of serious illness can inflict on one’s life, “the present is not what the past was supposed to lead up to, and
the future is scarcely thinkable”. Writing is a “way of redrawing maps and finding new destinations”. I have lived
with acute anxiety, panic and depression all my adult life, but at a certain point in my early thirties it all got much
worse. There was a feeling of having my back to the wall. Everything that had worked in the past to keep the fear at
arm’s length—all the avoiding and all the medicating, all the trying to stay ahead of it—stopped working. At this
terrifying new limit of myself I was paralysed and more unwell that I had ever been before. I started writing down
small details of my long slow days, simply because I needed to do something, and there was very little I was able to
do.
Frank’s metaphor of writing as mapping evokes illness’s other great metaphor of ‘the journey’. Popular illness
memoirs often draw on this metaphor in stories that pose “illness as the occasion for a journey that becomes a quest”
(Frank 1995, p. 115). In these stories the autobiographical self is written into a triumphant narrative that resolves in
a return to health with a redemptive story to share. The illness experience that has motivated this research unfolded
in completely the opposite way. Instead of the feel-good triumph of individual will, something more like a profound
undoing of the self happened, like “the crack-up” described in F Scott Fitzgerald’s (2009, p. 21) famous essay of the
same title: “some sort of clean break” that came out in the end, “but it came out all right for a different person”.
Fitzgerald’s 1939 account of nervous breakdown captures the complexity of an illness experience that is all at once,
physical, nervous, psychological and spiritual, that does not resolve in a unified, recovered first person narrator. If
there has been a ‘quest’ during this research, it has been to explore a way to write an experience of illness that does
not simply restore and unify the ill subject, but opens out to articulate the complexity and the “chaos” of illness, its
“insults, agonies and losses that words necessarily fail” (Frank 1995, p. 98). Rather than a triumphant journey of the
recovered ego, writing my illness has been an ongoing exploration of “the soul in its confusion, its variety, its
imperfection” (Woolf 2003, p. 112), a self that does not always come out on top. It has been a necessary examination
of the “slippery animal” (Twichell 2002, p. 21) that is too-neatly signified by the downward stroke of the ‘I’. The
essay in its Montaignean tradition, of “a mind at work on the page” (Klaus 2012, p. xiii) has provided a useful form
for writing this kind of illness account. Klaus’s notion of the “existential essay” (2010, p. 131), which updates the
essay’s masculinist traditions, provides a further model for writing a fragmented and chaotic experience of illness in
which recovery does not necessarily equal narrative resolution.

Illness as a journey: the ‘quest’ narrative
Since the 1990s, memoir has been “written, published (or self-published), reviewed, consumed, adapted into film,
celebrated (and disparaged) as never before in literary history” (Couser 2011, p. 229). It is “the genre in the skittish
period around the turn of the millennium” (Gilmore 2015, p. 1). The memoir boom has seen a particular interest in
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stories of illness, trauma and disability; Couser (2011 p. 230) goes so far as to say that “the memoir boom has at
least coincided with, if not been impelled by” the rise of illness and disability writing. Memoir is the ideal form for
exploring individual experiences of illness, being a democratic form in which ordinary people can “write about a
specific set of experiences, or one’s own story” (Rak 2013, p. 5). Rak finds memoir is a key form for the expression
of the liberal Western subject but also that it has a particular “dual status” in which its success in contributing to
public discourses of selfhood and identity is often closely tied to its distribution as a “marketable commodity”.
Memoir must “construct, package, and market identity so that others will want to buy it” (p. 7). In the millennial
memoir boom, as illness stories have become an increasingly marketable commodity they have increasingly taken
on what Couser (1997, p. 39) has termed ‘the comic plot’. These are stories that “end happily with some significant
recovery, the narrators are healed, if not cured, and without exception they are, or claim to be, better off at the end
than at the beginning.”
There can be no better recent example of this than Eat Pray Love (Gilbert 2006), the memoir-phenomenon that sold
4,274,804 copies in its first year of publication in the USA alone (Gilmore 2010, p. 669). Elizabeth Gilbert’s story of
triumph over depression and personal crisis is set as a travel narrative in which she overcomes her problems by
eating pizza in Italy, spending time in an ashram in India, and falling in love in Bali (with a book deal already sewn
up while she is doing it). The ‘comic plot’ that had dominated the memoir boom is similar to Frank’s (1995) notion
of the ‘quest’ model of illness story. The quest narratives follow the structure of the “hero’s journey” as outlined in
Joseph Campbell’s 1949 work of comparative mythology (Frank 1995, pp. 115–117). It begins with “departure”,
continues to “initiation” and “the road of trials” and ends in the final stage of “return” when “the teller returns as one
who is no longer ill but is marked by illness”. We can see how Eat Pray Love easily fits the quest structure, not least
because it explicitly uses a travel story as the narrative thread of the book. The initiation stage of the hero’s journey
begins in the second chapter as Gilbert’s autobiographical narrator lies crying “for something like the forty-seventh
consecutive night” (p. 25) on the bathroom floor of the home she and her husband have set up for child-rearing and
middle-class life. “The only thing more unthinkable than leaving was staying; the only thing more impossible than
staying was leaving.” Of course, she crosses the ‘first threshold’ of the hero’s journey and leaves. Crossing the
threshold begins the next stage in the hero’s journey: initiation. Gilbert’s illness journey is entwined with a spiritual
quest, and it is her first “conversation” with “God” (p. 37) that marks the initiation point of the narrative. The ‘road
of trials’ that must follow includes breakdown, depression and medications, conflict with her ex-husband, and then
gradually wellness, self-love and a new romance. The return of the hero takes place in the book’s final chapters on
the Indonesian island Gili Meno, where the narrator had been at the start of her journey “all by myself … at the very
worst of that entire dark journey”(p. 480). Gilbert returns triumphant, having “circled the world, settled my divorce
… erased all mood-altering medications from my system, learned to speak a new language, sat upon God’s palm for
a few unforgettable moments”. She is all fixed: “I am happy and healthy and balanced.”
Frank (1995, pp. 120–123) distinguishes between different kinds of quest narratives: the “manifesto”, in which the
self-knowledge learned in the quest “carries demands for social action”, and “auto-mythology”, in which “individual
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change, not social reform is emphasized”. The market pressure of the memoir boom has seen these ‘automythological’ quest narratives displace quest narratives that might challenge “dominant reading practices around
truth-telling” (Gilmore 2010, p. 658). Gilmore finds the generic demands of the memoir boom make it much more
difficult for “redemption-wary discourse of self-representation to gain traction”. The “sometimes extravagantly
affirmative” (Couser 1997, p. 45) tone of these narratives can also pose issues of authenticity. In breast cancer
stories for instance, the high recurrence rate of the illness makes a happy ending potentially a misrepresentation of
the disease. Between the writing, the publication and reading of the story, the happy narrative resolution is often out
of date. Returning here to Eat Pray Love, in this way Gilbert’s own fairytale ending eventually revealed its own
fiction when in January 2016 she announced on social media that she was separating from the “Brazilian lover” with
whom she sailed into the sunset at the end of the book. Acknowledging the authenticity gap between lived
experience and the neatly crafted narrative closure of her memoir, Gilbert herself asked her fans to respect her
privacy and understand “this is a story that I am living—not a story that I am telling” (THR Staff 2016).

From illness memoir to illness essay
In her essay ‘A Sketch of the Past’, Virginia Woolf (1985, p. 65) considers her own memoirs, the difficulty of writing
memoir, and “why so many of them are failures”. Memoirs often “say ‘this is what happened’; but they do not say
what the person was like to whom it happened. And the events mean very little unless we know first to whom they
happened.” ‘A Sketch of the Past’ deftly unpicks some of the trickiest territory here, flowing between memories and
reflections on memory’s inability to represent the self on the page. Considering vivid images and textures of her
childhood visits to St Ives, the family’s seaside retreat, Woolf recalls “hearing the waves breaking one, two, one, two
and sending a splash of water over the beach” and “the [nursery] blind drawing its little acorn across the floor as the
wind drew the blind out” (p. 65). If life “is a bowl that one fills and fills – my bowl without doubt stands upon this
memory”. But in an account of a life, of course memories are unreliable. They are selective—“one only remembers
what is exceptional. And there seems to be no reason why one thing is exceptional and another not” (p. 69). With
characteristically profound simplicity, Woolf understands that the reason writing a memoir is so difficult is that “the
person is evidently immensely complicated”. Writing the self is not a straightforward narrative activity that can be
charted on a simple linear narrative. Even if one could precisely recollect things that have happened, this would leave
out an entire dimension of experience that doesn’t happen in time, but rather, is felt: “those instincts, affections,
passions, attachments—there is no single word for them” (p. 79). These are near impossible to capture in narrative but
“It is by such invisible presence that the ‘subject of this memoir’ is tugged this way and that every day of his life; it is
they that keep him in position” (p. 80). In wellness, occupied with activity and purpose, consciousness more easily
remains sovereign over this invisible dimension of life “not lived consciously” (p. 70). But in illness, the self falls
more easily into this slipstream that Woolf, again with characteristic simplicity, sums up as the space of “non-being”.
In illness “the proportion of non-being is much larger”, she says “I had a slight temperature last week; almost the
whole day was non-being.”
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In ‘A Sketch of the Past’, Woolf is circling around the riddle of the “self-story” (Frank 1995, pp. 55–56), the infinity
loop of language, consciousness and identity in which autobiographical writing gets us tangled. The ‘self-story’, a
term originally arising from the psychoanalytic setting, “the self is formed in what is told”. The story we tell about
ourselves is enclosed within another, “the story that there is a self to tell something to”. In writing the self, we are
confronted by this story within the self-story. As in Woolf’s essay, the autobiographical writer circles around memory
and feelings searching for the base of this existential self, but finds only more stories. For Woolf (2003, p. 112), Michel
de Montaigne is the writer who is best able to capture this impossible fluidity, the “movement and change [that] are
the essence of our being”, “giving the whole map, weight, colour, and circumference of the soul in its confusion, its
variety, its imperfection”. Neither the world, nor the Montaignean self, is fixed. “I do not portray his being; I portray
his passage,” Montaigne (1958, p. 235) writes in ‘On Repentance’:
not a passage from one age to the other or, as the common people say, from seven years to seven years, but
from day to day, from minute to minute. I must suit my story to the hour, for soon I may change, not only
by chance but also by intention. It is a record of various and variable occurrences, an account of thoughts
that are unsettled and, as chance will have it, at times contradictory.
The Montaignean essay is a mode of “exploration rather than persuasion” (Klaus 2012, p. xvi), a precise but
meandering following of the mind’s response to different subjects and situations. It does “not proceed along the line
of time … does not tell us what event succeeded what other” (Cohen 1958, p. 9). It is an autobiographical form
characterised by openness and wandering, that often raises questions without resolutions, a “notoriously flexible and
adaptable form” with “the freedom to move anywhere, in all directions” (Lopate 1995, p. xxxvii).

Essaying the ‘chaos’ of illness
F Scott Fitzgerald’s 1939 ‘The Crack-Up’ is a searing example of a writer contending with the mystery and terror of
the self, revealed in an episode of mental illness and using the essay to write this fractured experience of self.
Fitzgerald uses the essay’s flexibility of form to write this experience that is all at once physical, nervous,
psychological and spiritual. He knows readers would prefer to hear from the confident voice of one who has
returned triumphantly from the hero’s journey, those “to whom all self-revelation is contemptible, unless it ends with
a noble thanks to the gods for Unconquerable Soul” (Fitzgerald 2009, p. 19). But he cannot summon it because ‘the
hero’ has ceased to exist: “there was not an ‘I’ anymore,” he says, “not a basis on which I could organize my selfrespect” (p. 25). ‘The Crack-Up’ consistently avoids explaining any causes of, or resolution to, the narrator’s mental
health crisis. Details are touched on and then passed over, and reflections interrupted mid-stream. Early in the essay
Fitzgerald tells the reader that not long before the “realisation of having cracked” he had sat “in the office of a great
doctor and listened to a grave sentence” (p. 14). Narrative logic immediately wants to know the details of this
medical conversation: is it cancer? Is it Fitzgerald’s rumoured tuberculosis? Has it got something to do with his
alcoholism? It is obviously something serious, as it leads him to “a strong and sudden instinct that I must be alone”.
But that is as much detail as is revealed. In less than a page, his condition has somehow resolved and got worse in
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the same instant: “—And then suddenly, surprisingly, I got better.” He says, “—And cracked like an old plate as
soon as I heard the news” (p. 15). “That is the real end to this story”, Fitzgerald writes in the next sentence. The
interruption to narrative logic and flow is constant throughout.
‘The Crack-Up’ is an example of illness narrative that Frank (1995, p. 97) calls “the chaos narrative”. In chaos
narratives, “the modernist bulwark of remedy, progress, and professionalism cracks to reveal vulnerability, futility,
and impotence”. Modern medicine’s “single minded teleos of cure” (p. 83) that underpins quest narratives is
markedly absent from Fitzgerald’s account. ‘The Crack-Up’ is an experience “sodden-dark” and “very distinctly not
modern” (Fitzgerald 2009, p. 27). The essay distinguishes between two types of psychic blows: ones that “you
remember and blame things on and, in moments of weakness, tell your friends about” and then there is the sort that
that you don’t feel “until you realise with finality that in some regard you will never be as good a man again” (p. 11).
In this “dangerous mist” the narrator has “developed a sad attitude toward sadness, a melancholy attitude toward
melancholy and a tragic attitude toward tragedy” that “spells the death of accomplishment”. Even considering
Fitzgerald’s frequent ironic intent in this piece, the bitterness is unmistakable. There is no redemption in this
situation, only deeper disillusionment. Frank (1995, p. 98) finds that the chaos narrative model of illness writing
“traces the edges of a wound that can only be told around”. In chaos narratives there is “a hole in the narrative that
cannot be filled in”. Over and over, ‘The Crack-Up’ refers to such a hole in the narrative using the metaphor of the
crack and the rupture, “some sort of clean break” (p. 28), and also in images of “a vacuous quiet” (p. 20), “a feeling
that I was standing at twilight on a deserted range, with an empty rifle in my hands and the targets down”. For Frank
(1995, p. 98) the gap at the centre of chaos narratives is an impediment to representation, he finds “these stories
cannot be told but can only be lived”. But as ‘The Crack-Up’ demonstrates, in the essay we find a form that can
write with the chaos of illness and trauma, without having to declare the experience exactly, or resolve it in a tidy
ending.

Essaying chaos and trauma
Frank’s model of the chaos narrative chimes with Gilmore’s (2015, p. 7) assertion that writing trauma brings us to
the limits of autobiography. Trauma is a “self-altering, even self-shattering experience”, central to which “are the
multiple difficulties that arise in trying to articulate it”. Language “bears a heavy burden” because trauma is
considered both as “unrepresentable”, “beyond language in some crucial way”, but also an experience that must be
realised through language. For survivors there is often a feeling that “language fails in the face of trauma”, that when
we come to express the intensity of the experience it “mocks language and confronts it with its insufficiency”. In
trauma we find a “constituent ambivalence” with regard to language, which for the victim-survivor can amount to
“an impossible injunction to tell what cannot, in this view, be spoken”. It is useful to read Joan Didion’s 1979 essay
‘The White Album’ through this lens. Like ‘The Crack-Up’, ‘The White Album’ is another iconic example of a
writer using the essay form to write a chaotic experience of the ill self, and trauma’s ambivalence toward language.
“We tell ourselves stories in order to live” (Didion 2009, p. 11) is the oft-misquoted first line of ‘The White Album’.
The searing point of the essay is exactly the opposite: that narrative, storytelling and language fails the narrator in
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the face of a chaotic and violent reality. Set in the years 1966 to 1971, ‘The White Album’ is an account of the
turbulent and transformative period of late 1960s USA told from the centre of the storm. As a writer and a star of the
60s pop cultural scene herself, Didion was uniquely placed within the glamour, intensity and violence of the cultural
moment. In ‘The White Album’ the autobiographical narrator performs the chaos she describes, using the metaphor
of ‘the story’ and the essay form’s fluidity to articulate the fragmentation of the subject:
I was supposed to have a script, and I had mislaid it. I was supposed to hear cues, and I no longer did. I was
meant to know the plot, but all I knew was what I saw: flash pictures in variable sequence, images with no
‘meaning’ beyond their temporary arrangement. Not a movie but a cutting room experience. (p. 13)
In fragments throughout the essay, Didion describes living in a “large house in a part of Hollywood that had once
been expensive and was now described by one of my acquaintances as ‘a senseless killing neighbourhood’” (p. 15).
One of the essay’s anchoring events is the murder of Sharon Tate, her unborn child, and four others by the Manson
Family on August 9, 1969 that is referred to in the essay as “the murders on Cielo Drive” (p. 47). Didion is “sitting
in the shallow end of my sister-in-law’s swimming pool in Beverley Hills” (p. 42) when she hears the news. “The
phone rang many times during the next hour”, she says, bringing “garbled and contradictory” details: “One caller
would say hoods. The next would say chains … Black masses were imagined, and bad trips blamed.” But the point
is, “I remember that no one was surprised”. Random violence has become as strangely normal as making Janis
Joplin a “brandy-and-Benedictine in a water tumbler” after a show (p. 25). Like ‘The Crack-Up’, ‘The White
Album’ uses the essay form to write the self not into coherence, but to leave it in fragments. In its early stages, the
essay includes an excerpt from a psychiatric report about an unnamed patient, who has presented with “abundant
signs of failing defences”, “primitive, regressive libidinal preoccupations”, and “affective controls” that are
“tenuously” maintained by “intellectualisation, obsessive-compulsive devices, projection, reaction-formation, and
somatisation” (p. 14). Deadpan, underneath this description, the narrator tells us “the patient to whom this
psychiatric report refers is me” (p. 15). “By way of comment I offer only that an attack of vertigo and nausea does
not now seem to me an inappropriate response to the summer of 1968.”
The murder of silver screen actor Ramon Novarro in his Hollywood home in October 1968 is another violent event
occupying the essay. In a poignant detail toward the end of the essay, Didion makes a final dark comment on the
emptiness of writing and narrative referring to his convicted killer, Paul Ferguson, who has won first prize in a PEN
prison writing contest. He announces his “plans to continue my writing” which has helped him to “reflect on
experience and see what it means” (p. 48). But Didion’s narrator has found no such solace: “Quite often I reflect on
the big house in Hollywood … on Ramon Novarro and on the fact that Roman Polanski and I are godparents to the
same child, but writing has not yet helped me to see what it means.”
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Embodying the ill self: the ‘existential essay’
‘The Crack-Up’ and ‘The White Album’ are two early and iconic examples of the essay being used to write a messy
and chaotic ill self. It is only relatively recently however, that the essay form has been used for the subject matter of
illness. Even in a literary tradition where selfhood and its workings have been a central concern for five hundred
years, exploring its states of ill-health has not. Klaus (2010, p. 128) finds that modern and contemporary illness
essays, with their visceral detailing of the diseased body and humiliating chaos of a failing self, represent a form that
is “a radical transformation of the essayist’s persona and … tacit relationship to the reader” (p. 128) that is
implicated by gender. Historically, the essaying subject has been the “reasonable decent man talking to you or me or
anyone else of what he thought about life” (Lopate 1995, p. xlviii), someone who “revels in a kind of ownership of
the world” and is “free to ramble through … remarking at [his] leisure” (Dessaix 2010, p. 37). The subject matter for
these essaying gentlemen has been as polite as “the velvety college courts” (Klaus 2010, p. 127) upon which he
looked down from his library window. Unsurprisingly then, the messy and humiliating business of being sick has not
been a common topic for the essayist. Modern and contemporary illness essays that take readers “inside medicine
cabinets and into bathrooms”, along to psychiatric consultations, and into “sleepless beds and sexless beds” (p. 122)
represent a new form of essaying. They are raw, embodied and impolite, “energized by a greater intensity than
would be described merely by the term ‘intimate’” or “the friendly, conversational tone” of the traditional personal
essay. In searching for a term that defines the modern and contemporary essay that addresses the ill self in “body and
mind, flesh and spirit”, Klaus (p. 130) suggests the term “existential essay”. Existential essays, he says, take illness
as a site for “exploring, expressing, and embodying the self in some of the most pressing circumstances of its
existence” (p. 131). Klaus’s observations call to mind Woolf’s 1930 essay On Being Ill, in which she noted that a
literature of illness would require a language “more primitive, more sensual, more obscene” (2012, p. 7). “The
merest schoolgirl, when she falls in love, has Shakespeare, Donne, Keats to speak her mind for her; but let a sufferer
try to describe a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry.” Woolf finds the absence of illness as a
subject in literature is based in an associated neglect of the body. Literature “does its best to maintain that its concern
is with the mind; that the body is a sheet of plain glass through which the soul looks straight and clear”. Literature
finds “the body in the philosopher’s turret” or “kicking the body, like an old leather football, across leagues of snow
and desert in pursuit of conquest”. But those “great wars” the body wages “against the assault of fever” or “the
income of melancholia” are neglected.
In the anthology Unholy Ghost: Writers on Depression (Casey 2002), amid excerpts from a few ‘manly’ texts such
as A. Alvarez’s From the Savage God and William Styron’s Darkness Visible, Lauren Slater’s ‘Noontime’ (2002)
stands out as an example of ‘existential essaying’. Lauren Slater has made a career of writing her own mental illness,
using it as a site for sophisticated explorations of subjectivity, truth and being, and the limits of literary convention.
Her “metaphorical” memoir Lying (2000) intentionally used epilepsy as an ambiguous metaphor to jam the gears of
the autobiographical pact. In ‘Noontime’, Slater explores the wrenching decisions made by a woman who is trying
to conceive while taking psychiatric medication. “I take Prozac,” she tells the reader. “In fact, I come close to
holding the world’s record for the longest time spent on the drug—ten years” (p. 78). She jokes with someone at a
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party about who is on the most medication: “Well, I’m on Klonopin too,” she says, “for my anxiety.” Her
interlocutor is also on Klonopin, “plus Wellburtrin”. You win, she tells him as they “smile sadly” at each other.
“Because it’s no joke, his medication issue”. ‘Noontime’ proceeds to detail the harrowing process of trying to get
pregnant while knowing that the science is still out on the safety of most psychiatric drugs for the growing foetus.
“They said it would be more dangerous for me to go off my medication than for the foetus to be on it, but even as
they announced this, I saw a look of alarm in their eyes” (p. 79).
The narrator takes the advice of her doctors, but then, swayed by the fear of side-effects and her trouble conceiving,
which she blames on the medication, she stops taking it and slides into an acute episode. ‘Noontime’ fulfils the claim
that contemporary ‘existential essays’ include visceral details previously considered off-limits to literature. It is
necessarily full of urinating and bleeding “a steady brown staining” (p. 79), all these leaking details of women’s
experience. “If I stop the Prozac and cleanse myself with vinegar, and pee out green in toxic streams, then will I feel
like a good mother?” the narrator asks. The gendered nature of this kind of writing and its transgression of literary
convention is addressed directly about mid-way through the essay (p. 87), when the reputable journal Harper’s calls
about an autobiographical piece that Slater has submitted. “I’ll be honest with you,” the editor says. “Women liked
it, the men didn’t.” The women like the “extended use of first person” and the men want “more theory, less
subjectivity”. The narrator knows what the editor wants: “make it less womanish, less lubricated, altogether drier”.
During this project I have frequently had to stop myself from veering back into a suitably polite literary voice and
writing something less embarrassing, less raw, more acceptable, more conventional. I have frequently reminded
myself not to spare myself, or the reader, to reject “the belletristic for lettres laides” (Duplessis 1996, p. 25) and
write the “in-your-face, un-pretty, un-genial that returns us to material coordinates”. But the judgment of the
‘reasonable man’ is still everywhere, in my own doubts, and in questions from others at candidature presentations
and other kinds of academic research forums. To write the chaotic, messy, failing ill self without resolution, and
without shame, is to essay into new territory.
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All four factions of the international boxing world are at the Barclay
Centre in Brooklyn tonight, to see Deontay ‘The Bronze Bomber’
Wilder’s third defense of the WBC Heavyweight title. Wilder has been
WBC Heavyweight champ for exactly two years, since he defeated
Haitian-Canadian Bermane Stiverne at the MGM Grand in Las Vegas, in
January 2015. His challenger tonight is Artur ‘The Pin’ Szpilka, a 26-yearold Pole who’s lost only one in 21.
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There’s just a smattering of people watching Light Heavyweights Carlos
Gongora and Derrick Adkins go six rounds, while we wait for the main
event. I wonder why I am so relieved to be here, and not at the the
Poets House with everyeone else. A woman behind me yells “Yes! Yes!”
as Gongora lands a punch. The referee calls it at 1.58 into the fourth.
It’s Gongora by TKO.
.
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It is early January. I am sore to my bones with hard feelings. Tonight
before I came, I just lay on the hotel bed and felt it, because there was
nothing else I could do. All over, these clusters of feeling that just hurt
like Christmas. In my head and my gut, an aching sting like the pain that
comes from holding ice. I feel tight across my ribs, and right in the
chest, deep, a hollowness like I have hit the bottom of a
tank.

.
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Wilder arrives in the ring wearing a hooded black robe, and a gold
Venetian mask. He is a commanding 6’ 7” and looking loose and
relaxed. Szpilka appears on his heels in a black satin robe, with a red
bandana worn like a bandit’s mask over his nose and mouth. Szpilka is
two and a half inches shorter than Wilder but fit as a fiddle. He bounces
merrily on his toes as the referee and the corner men sort themselves
out.
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The bout begins and there’s a lot of wide swinging. They circle, and
circle, both so cagey. Then, quick jab, jab— not a lot of contact. Just
this tension, circling, always standing about one or two feet off each
other, trying to stike. Jab— no contact. Bobbing, circling, trying to get
inside each other’s stance. The TV lights bounce off their skin, shining,
ripped bodies, circling, gleaming, as they stay just out of reach.
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The square blue canvas and the red ropes. The blue padding on one
corner of the ring, and the red padding on the other. Two women in
blue bikinis circle in between rounds, holding up number cards. On four
huge screens set above the ring, we see the action up close. Late in the
fourth Wilder starts to land a couple, and in the replay we see it! Oh! —
That was right in the face. Plumb right in the face! Yes. Yes, I do feel
that—
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In the fifth round Wilder’s starting to break through. But Szpilka comes
out pumped, and suddenly Wilder’s on the ropes. Szpilka is now
punching wildly, throwing a lot of left hooks. Wilder counters with a
left—oh! A crazy right uppercut lands right on Szpilka’s chin. That was
fast! That was lightning fast. The stand-off’s really over now, the fight is
on.
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Szpilka is ducking and weaving, his fitness is incredible, and he’s not
backing down. He ducks one, throws one, and cops one all at the same
time. Again! Oh! He gets thrown against the corner by an uppercut to
the chin. He drops his hands like he’s stunned for a second, and looks
back at Wilder, like—I dunno, just looks straight back at him. He drops
his hands in a kind of gesture like ‘C’mon! Do it again. Do it again!’
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You can see in his eyes the whole thing go straight through his body.
The force of the punch ripples through flesh and bone and out the
other side. Again! Let me see it again! I want to watch that moment.
Wilder slips, he swings and he slips. Is he tired? They must be so tired. I
am tired from the intensity of this. Yes, I do feel it— this urgent
immediacy, I feel it in my own flesh and bone. This is the kind of fight I
want. Under hot lights, live on TV.
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In the seventh, Wilder seems to be stalking his opponent. Szpilka’s
quick but Wilder has the edge, bup-bup— his combinations are fast,
jab, slip, jab—lightning fast and connecting. Szpilka lands a couple but
Wilder’s much more accurate. Szpilka’s still dancing and bobbing,
moving constantly, but you’d have to say that he’s looking defensive.
You’d have to say Wilder’s just waiting for his chance, and then—
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Did you see that?
Did anybody see—?
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Szpilka’s on his back at the edge of the ring. Oh! Jesus, he’s just out.
Oh! He’s out like a light. The ringside medic shines a torch in his eyes.
His team crowd around him. The camera’s in there beaming it on to the
big screen. A minute later he’s still flat out, his feet facing into the ring
and his head under the ropes. But I must see the replay. Oh!
Unbelievable. A right to the jaw and that was it. Oh! Two minutes, 24
seconds into the ninth—
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Szpilka is getting put on a guerney, he’s conscious now and Wilder
leans over and touches him on the shoulder. I get a rush of feeling at
this spectacle of limits, a bit dizzy, a bit queasy. Yes, I do feel that. But
something about it also feels clarifying, so clear-cut. This dramatisation
of the hard borders of the self. I want to know myself like this somehow,
definitely, unequivocally. I want to know where I stop and where others
begin.
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You will come to know your body
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Jeremy says, “Try skipping.” He says, “Do ten push-ups.”
I say, “I can’t do push-ups.”
Jeremy says, “Yes you can.”
I say, “I want to learn boxing.”
Jeremy says, “Have you done it before?”
I tell him I learnt a bit of technique from a personal trainer at the expensive gym down
the road, and I think he knew what he was doing.
Jeremy says, “Yeah, we’ll see.”
He says, “Line up in front of the mirror and throw punches at yourself.”
I say, “I feel stupid.”
Jeremy says, “Just do it.”
I try not to look at myself in the floor to ceiling mirrors because when I do all I see is
a small white woman in a too-big green sweatshirt, bouncing awkwardly, not on her
toes, around a boxing gym.
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Jeremy says, “See this circle? You’re gonna move around, this way, that way, keep
moving around.”
I am meant to be moving around a skipping rope laid on the ground, throwing quick
punches every time I put my left foot inside it.
Jeremy says I’m going too slow.
He says, “Have you ever tried to download something, and you get a bit of it, then it
stops, and then you get a bit more, and then it goes slow again? That’s what you look
like.”
Jeremy says, “Keep your feet apart, like tram tracks.”
He says, “See, turn your shoulders, turn your hips, see, as this arm goes forward, this
shoulder drops, like a pulley system.”
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Jeremy is young, slight, Belarussian by birth, and an Australian amateur featherweight
silver medallist.
One day he’s got me running up and down some stairs, and he puts himself on the
scales near the bottom.
“What do you weigh?” I ask him.
Jeremy says, “Sixty-one. Three too many.”
Jeremy says, “Ten minutes shoulder work.” He hands me two pink one-kilo barbells
and says, “Hold these out front at shoulder height and keep ’em there.”
He does it with me. As he holds out his arms, I notice that his back is swayed and his
shoulders are rounded.
I say, “Your posture’s shit.”
Jeremy says, “I know. I’m hunched over from boxing.”
Jeremy says, “Hold your chin down and to the side, see, you want to protect it with
your left shoulder.”
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I don’t want to do any of this, really. I don’t want to get fit, I don’t want to push
through to the next stage of my recovery, I don’t want to start writing again. It’s all
hard, hard work. But it’s time.
My brain is coming back a bit better now, my energy is a bit more consistent. This
time, the crash was literal—
Ms Strahan is a 37-year-old woman who is a university lecturer and has
started a PhD. Ms Strahan was injured in a bicycle accident when she was
riding downhill and crashed head-first onto the road. According to the
ambulance report, there was a period of loss of consciousness of
approximately 1–2 minutes. There was damage to the front of the helmet and
abrasions to her face and body. She was discharged home after a two-night
stay in hospital. Based on the available information, Ms Strahan’s accident
resulted in a mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI).
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I don’t remember anything about the accident. I know there was a speed bump in the
dark, and I flew like an arrow into the bitumen. I know from my injuries that I did not
put out my hands to break the fall (why didn’t I put out my hands?).
The first thing I remember is the feeling of the gurney sliding underneath me as I was
loaded into (out of?) the ambulance.
Ms Strahan reports that since the accident, she has experienced
concentration difficulties, reduced frustration tolerance, and impaired
executive functioning (higher level thinking including problem solving,
planning and organisation, and flexible thinking). She becomes easily
overwhelmed by new or complex situations. Pre-existing but resolved anxiety
problems have also resurfaced and she experiences mood instability.
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Jeremy says, “Hi champ. How you feeling?” He hands me a pair of gloves.
He says, “Here you go, they’re kind of new, not too disgusting.”
The gloves are big and red. They feel damp inside. They belong to the gym, and
someone has just been using them.
I say, “Do boxing gloves come in sizes?”
Jeremy says, “Yeah, 14 ounce or 16 ounce depending on the padding. Not hand size,
they’re all the same hand size.”
Jeremy puts on the pads and holds one up on my left.
He says, “Jab.”
I throw my right hand into it.
Jeremy drops the mitt and looks at me.
He says, “Jab!”
I say, “Jab’s my left?”
Jeremy says, “Jab’s your left unless you’re left-handed. You can also call it left-lead
or right-lead.”
Jeremy holds up both pads in front of me.
He says, “Come on, two lefts and a right into the pads. Left, right, left.”
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It seems counterintuitive doesn’t it, to learn boxing to recover from a head injury. I
am not at this Police and Youth Club gym looking for another concussion.
I am looking for form. I need to feel out the boundaries of the self again, and I have
no choice but to start here. I can’t talk and think and analyse the self back into shape,
because I can’t think anything through.
When I throw my fist into a heavy bag I find a knowable limit. I do it again, and this
boundary remains, and it does not slip around. In fact, each time I do it, this knowing
gets stronger and more trustworthy.
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My skipping has improved. Jeremy does it with me and I’m keeping a pretty good
time. He crosses and uncrosses his arms and says, “Can you do that?”
I say, “Not today, show off.”
Shadowboxing: left foot forward, I bounce and I try to keep my shoulders loose. Ok, I
think I’m getting better at this, maybe I look a bit better in the mirror.
Jeremy says, “C’mon L, threes and fours.”
bup-bup-bup
bup-bup-bup-bup
bup-bup-bup-BAH
He says, “long and straight”, “keep your right hand up”, “moving, moving”, “nice n
r’laxed”.
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I must think of my whole self now, only as bruised flesh and damaged neurological
pathways. My brain is no longer the seat of my ego—the I in ‘I am’—it is just another
body part that must be rested and iced and heated and fed, and rested again, and
conditioned, from scratch.
When I see someone doing those things I used to do quickly and with ease, like
writing or reading or engaging in a complex conversation, I don’t see the person
anymore. I only see connections firing in the brain: I think “Wow, look how are
strong and well-developed they are, those pathways are really established.”
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Jeremy texts: Hey Lucinda. How you feeling? We good to go tomorrow?
I text back: Hiya yeah ok 8.30 good
Jeremy holds up the pads at different angles.
He says, “What you see is what you punch.”
I have to throw uppercuts, hooks, lefts and rights, depending on where his hands are.
It’s hard to keep my balance. I think I’m leaning too far forward on my left foot.
There’s a pain in my right hip. I try to stay loose, I shake my head and shoulders in
between punching.
Jeremy says, “moving in between”, “always keep moving”. He pushes back at me
with the pad as soon as I’ve hit it. I’m kind of spinning backward anticlockwise. The
canvas feels good under my feet, kind of sticky, both hard and soft.
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I can’t get the hook. There’s just a lot to think about.
Jeremy says, “Pivot your left hip forward, turn your shoulder, bring your elbow up
and swivel. You’re putting out your cigarette with your back foot.”
I say, “What’s with the elbow?”
Jeremy says, “Bring it along, and bring the hook along with it.”
I say, “Why is it so hard?”
Jeremy says, “Because it is. Come on L.”
I throw from the gut and kind of feel my spine and all those muscles of my torso
holding me up.
“It comes from your core,” I say. “You have to punch from your core muscles.”
Jeremy says, “Of course.”
Connection. Smack. Leather on leather feels really good. Something sparks and I feel
strong for an instant, and I understand why young men sometimes go out looking for a
fight.
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We’re jogging up a hill and Jeremy says, “I qualified for the nationals.”
The guy at reception says, “Red or blue?”
I say, “Red.”
Jeremy says, “Wraps!”
Hold your hand flat out palm down and spread your fingers wide. Now, see this loop?
Hook this round your thumb and then take it around your wrist a couple of times, but
not too tight. Now go over the top of your hand and round your palm a few times.
Then up and through your fingers, and lock it off round your wrist.
Up and through your fingers, and lock it off.
Up and through, and lock it off.
Now across your knuckles, but not too tight. You wanna leave a bit of sport at the
front and a bit at the back around the wrist.
Wraps feel good.
I say, “I think I’ll leave these on today.”
Jeremy says, “You might get a few weird looks.”
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Jeremy says, “I’m training with you today. We’re gonna bag for a minute, and plank
for a minute, and then we’ll swap.”
I try to stay light on my feet as I hit the bag, holding my spine straight.
Jeremy says, “Your fists are like rocks.”
I think of my fists as small rocks on the ends of my arms. My shoulders tense and rise.
“Loose,” Jeremy says, “nice and loose.”
I bag for a minute. Jeremy says, “Swap.”
I watch him on the bag, chin down, kind of looking up from beneath his brow and
punching fast.
I say, “Are you relaxed when you fight?”
Jeremy says, “Totally relaxed. If you tense up, you slow down.”
“So before you started boxing, were you a tense person? Like were you a bit more
wound up?”
Jeremy says, “Nah. I was fat.”
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I notice that boxing’s not about pounding away at something, it’s very much about
lightness and precision: bounce, move, breathe and then impact.
Quick and sharp. Every now and again, I get the balance, and the momentum, and the
footwork, and the focus right, and throw a good punch.
Jeremy says, “left jab”
Jeremy says, “left jab”
He says, “two lefts”, “two lefts then a right”
He says, “again”
Jeremy says, “left, left, right, left uppercut”
Jeremy says, “left, left, right cross, two uppercuts and a left hook”
Jeremy says, “c’mon L, back, forward, moving, keep moving”
I say, “How’d you go?”
Jeremy says, “Nah, lost in a split decision.”
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My GP invites me to think of my head injury as a dancer’s sprained ankle. She means
that as a writer and a researcher, I need my brain to do complex cognitive things that
other people don’t do, and this is why it is taking me longer to recover. I think this is
true, but I also think there’s more to it.
Before the accident, my brain was the seat of a self who was cognitively sharp and
nimble, but also emotionally defensive. Without my complex intellectual functioning,
I feel devastatingly vulnerable.
In a 1960s lecture on child development, psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott spoke of
the “uneasy intelligence of some whose good brains have become exploited”. It can
happen when a high-functioning intellect adapts to survive emotional deprivation.
I wonder about this, as I admit that in the past I have relished anxious breakdowns as
an opportunity to prove my intelligence (if only to myself). I am sick again, but I will
think it through. I will work it out. Just watch me solve this problem.

201

Jeremy says, “What’s wrong this week?”
“I’m not sleeping,” I say.
Jeremy says, “C’mon lightning. Fire up girl.”
Jeremy says, “See, your opponent’s always facing you, so you’ve gotta move, see,
keep your hands up, keep your elbows in, see, keep moving, always keep moving. On
your toes, see, like that, good, keep moving, that’s better. Now throw your left,
straight, that’s it, throw your left, straight out and keep your balance. Again, throw it
twice, left, left, see, that’s good, keep moving. Throw it straight out and remember to
turn your fist, clench it, there, hold ’em up, elbows in.”
Jeremy says, “Like a turtle going into your shell, keep your elbows in, protecting
yourself.”
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Winnicott finds there is a “very strong tendency” for the individual with a “fine” but
“exploited” intellect to exist in a dissociated state from embodied experience. This
impoverished, dissociated self must be relinquished if the individual is to grow.
“In the healthy individual, it must be assumed, the mind is not something for the
individual to exploit in escape from psycho-somatic being.”
“The True Self comes from the aliveness of the body tissues and the working of bodyfunctions, including the heart’s action and breathing.”
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I meet a friend one night at our favourite place across the road from her yoga studio.
She tells me about a meditation on self-compassion she’s been doing, that helps you
to recognise and release the pain you are holding as tension in your body. I tell her
about my injured brain, the dissociated intellect, and how boxing is helping me
connect to a self in the body. I tell her about the loosening in my chest, and the sense
of something rising, maybe lifting away as I get stronger. I tell her about these great
energetic shifts, how I’m going to the bathroom during the day and just shitting this
bilious stuff out like some kind of purge.
My friend is interested, but she says, “I don’t know if boxing is the best way to
develop compassion.”
I have to think about this.
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I had forgotten that boxing is violent. There’s something about its radical
transparency that makes it seem ok to me, less violent than the bare-knuckled
psychological combat I grew up with, for instance.
My psychotherapist once asked me, “What kind of fighter are you? Do you cry and
scream? Do you explode and get over it? Do you stew and plot?
“Do you use money? Do you get lawyers? What do you do?”
I know what I usually do, I take it out on myself. I am really good at beating myself
up.
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Jeremy texts: Hey Lucinda? We good for tomorrow?
When I arrive at the gym there’s a guy sparring with a tennis ball, that is fixed by
elastic to the peak of his cap. He has a thick rubber band around his legs just above
his knees and he’s sweating like a pig through his olive-green t-shirt.
I say, “Do you think boxing is dangerous?”
Jeremy says, “Not really. Not more than a lot of other sports.”
“But,” I say, “you see fighters get cut, their faces all beaten up—”
Jeremy says, “Yeah, it’s the nature of the sport, but you won’t die from that. You’ve
got to get brain scans, if you’re not right you can’t fight.”
I tell him I heard on the radio, that two boxers this year have died in Australia, and the
AMA wants it banned.
Jeremy says, “I know one guy that died from a cerebral haematoma.”
I say, “Can you fight without getting hurt?”
Jeremy says, “Of course.”
I say, “So you don’t always get hurt?”
Jeremy says, “It depends what you mean by hurt.”
I say, “What’s your definition?”
Jeremy says, “I dunno, going to hospital.”
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Jeremy says, “Ten rounds on the bag, three minutes each like a heavyweight fight."
“Throw from the shoulder, don’t swing, quick jab, jab, move forward, move back, left
jab, keep moving.”
I grip my lower ribs with my core muscles and I get this uplift out of my hips, then
my sternum rises and I stand about a centimetre taller.
My neck and shoulders feel looser and my stomach muscles feel harder. There are
small bulges on my upper arms.
I feel planted on the ground. If I push against you, you will feel some purpose, if you
push against me, I can stand some ground, I will push back.
These embodied feelings are all new.
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“So what’s been happening?” I say. “What have you been doing since the nationals?”
Jeremy says, “I dunno, getting fat.”
Jeremy says, “left, right, slip, slip”
Jeremy says, “two lefts, bup-bup, nice and fast bup-bup”
Jeremy says, “left, right, roll, roll, left hook, right hook”
Jeremy says, “right, left, right, step back, right”
Jeremy says, “two lefts”; he says, “Yeah—but you’ve got to reload. Left. Left.”
Jeremy says, “left, right, roll, roll, duck, right”
Every now and again Jeremy whacks me around the ears with the mitts and says,
“Hands up!”
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Hopeless romantic: performing metaphors of illness
One night on a cold evening, not so long after my father had died suddenly from cancer, I was in the depths of
terrible anxiety and grief when a metaphor struck me like a parable. I was flipping through an old book of Leunig
cartoons when I was gripped by an image of a
road unfurling out of a figure’s head (Figure
15). It was an exact visual metaphor of the
redemption my anxious and grieving mind
hoped to find in the depths of my suffering. My
father’s death was a huge loss, perhaps my
worst fear realised. The path unfurling from the
figure’s head was the story I could make of this
pain. If I started writing it all out, finally it
would be redeemed. I carried a copy of this
cartoon in my pocket for a long time after that

Figure 15 Let it go, Michael Leunig, 1990

night. It became talismanic. In the healthy light of day it is hard to articulate the profound truth this metaphor
seemed to convey in the moment I saw it. But what appeared so deeply meaningful in that moment now appears
convoluted and strange.
Another anecdote occurs to me here, another epic narrative my ill brain conjured in an extreme moment that now
seems impossible to describe with any credibility. One weekday evening after a day of blind panic, hiding in
bathrooms and lying under my desk at work trying to manage my mood’s descent, I stumbled out of the office
desperate to get home. I was exhausted in the way that only people who have been seriously ill can understand.
Every step of the 200 metre walk to my tram stop was a test of will, at any moment I felt I might collapse,
disintegrate, just not make it those next few metres. As I finally arrived at the stop I saw my Number 16 sail past and
realised I was in the wrong place. The tram stop had been recently moved down a block as part of road upgrades. I
had to do it all again—walk another 200 metres. I really felt I could not do this. But all other options seemed equally
as fraught. Calling a taxi would for sure break me (just having to think of the phone number for instance). There was
no one at home to pick me up. But then suddenly, there was clarity. My cortisol-soaked brain sparked and threw a
spot of light on an idea that was enough to get me home: Ah! So this is it! This feeling that I am about to disintegrate
right here if I take one more step, is a moment of a becoming. I can survive this walk down the block, because I am
on the edge of a personal breakthrough. It is a test and I am at this edge because I am chosen for it. I am special.
Throughout this research I have been persistently fascinated by the mythologies and metaphors the ill person
inhabits—that I have inhabited myself, which are so much a part of surviving, coping with, finding one’s way
through the crisis. In a ‘Sketch of the Past’, Woolf (1985, p. 137) describes the metaphors she made of her grief after
the psychological “mutilations” caused by the loss of her mother Julia, her sister Stella and then finally her brother
Thoby. “I had my usual visual way of putting it,” she says, “I would see (after Thoby’s death) two great grindstones
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… and myself between them.” Her suffering was a test “in relation to the force which had respected me sufficiently
to make me feel myself ground between grindstones”. “Nobody could say ‘they’ had fobbed me off with a weak
little feeble slip of the precious matter … And this of course increased my sense of my own importance.” Metaphors
of illness are often “of a characterological predisposition”, Sontag (2009b, p. 98) finds in her celebrated essay of
1978 ‘Illness as Metaphor’. In the sense we make of illness we find metaphors of identity and stories of the self.
Sontag’s essay, written after her own diagnosis and treatment for cancer, is an analysis of the modern discourses of
illness, drawn from across literary and social texts. Sontag finds modern characterological metaphors of illness
perpetuate “fictions of responsibility” (p. 98), which are unhelpful and stigmatising to the ill. “It is hardly possible to
take up one’s residence in the kingdom of the ill unprejudiced by the lurid metaphors with which it has been
landscaped” (p. 3), she writes. Sontag’s point in this, and its companion piece, ‘AIDS and its Metaphors’, is that
“illness is not a metaphor”. The “healthiest way of being ill” is one “most purified of, most resistant to, metaphorical
thinking”. In my own illness writing, I have certainly found many metaphors of illness to be problematic in some of
the ways Sontag suggests. They can be lurid and sentimental, stigmatising, sometimes narcissistic. But I have also
found others to be astonishingly powerful and creatively useful. In working with the myths and metaphors of illness
in autobiographical accounts, the move to be made is perhaps a sidestep rather than Sontag’s proposed
“purification”. A lateral move across the surface of these discourses, where metaphors may be encountered
obliquely, and playfully inhabited as part of a performative act of writing the ill self.

Metaphors of illness
It is quite the cultural moment to be thinking about metaphors of illness. Like the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, the
current global pandemic “has provided a large-scale occasion for the metaphorizing of illness” (Sontag 2009b, p.
102). As with tuberculosis in the nineteenth century and cancer and AIDS in the twentieth, COVID-19 has become
“spectacularly, and similarly, encumbered by the trappings of metaphor” (p. 2). To consider just one striking
example, Sontag (pp. 73–4) finds within modern illness metaphors the idea of “a profound disequilibrium between
individual and society, with a society conceived of as the individual’s adversary”. Some insight is learnt here into
the startling conspiracy theories currently swirling around COVID-19 that see the virus as a hoax, and a lie
propagated by the state and corporate vested interests against the individual. In the current global pandemic, we see
a vivid animation of the way myths and metaphor are attached to a situation of threatening illness in order to make
sense of it. “Any important disease whose causality is murky, and for which treatment is ineffectual, tends to be
awash in significance” (p. 60), Sontag finds.
‘Illness as Metaphor’ was motivated by Sontag’s own diagnosis and treatment for cancer, during which time she
found many of her fellow patients “in the grip of fantasies about their illness by which I was quite unseduced” (p.
98). Their beliefs about cancer, she noticed were “the converse of now thoroughly discredited beliefs about
tuberculosis” and in this coincidence she found a location for an analysis of the way language and social texts
inform the way we experience and understand certain illness and disease. By ‘metaphor’, Sontag means simply
“saying a thing is or is like something-it-is-not” (p. 91). Metaphorical thinking about some illnesses becomes
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“specifically polemical” (p. 74) and is taken up within social and cultural discourse in a way that has meaning
beyond the condition itself. These health conditions that become social conditions, and then social texts that
“propose new critical standards” on both society and the individual are “master illnesses”. Both cancer and
tuberculosis, later AIDS (and of course now COVID-19) are master illnesses. In 1989, Sontag published the
companion essay ‘AIDS and its Metaphors’, observing (p. 101) that some of the stigmatising metaphors surrounding
cancer had been lifted by the emergence of AIDS: “It seems that societies need to have one illness which becomes
identified with evil, and attaches blame to its ‘victims’, but it is hard to be obsessed with more than one.”

Illness as adversary
As in the 1980s and the emergence of HIV-AIDS, in the “terrifying new disease” (p. 91) that we are currently facing
we see a dramatic reanimation of adversarial and militaristic metaphors. These are used both to explain the body’s
relation to the virus, and also the public health emergency that it has caused. We are “in a war against this virus”,
Prime Minister Scott Morrison said in an interview in March 2020, “and all Australians are enlisted to do the right
thing” (Prime Minister of Australia 2020). At the same time the USA was “at war with an invisible enemy” (Cathey
2020), while Boris Johnson was leading a “wartime government” against a “deadly enemy” (Rawlinson 2020) in the
UK. In ‘AIDS and its Metaphors’, Sontag (2009, p. 94) notes that military metaphors have a long and pre-scientific
genealogy, quoting Donne’s prose arias on illness from the seventeenth century, in which sickness is “a Canon” that
“batters all, overthrows all, demolishes all”. But with the advent of the microscope and the discovery of cellular
pathology, the idea of illness as a pitched battle between the body’s immune system and a pathogen takes on “new
credibility and precision”. In 1986, the viral microbes causing HIV were being described in the media as “tiny
invaders” and “diminutive foreigners”, against which the body’s immune system mobilises “rapidly advancing
defenders” (p. 138). In the twenty-first century, after two decades of a war on terrorism, this metaphor has changed
only so far in that the viral pathogens of COVID-19 are now “nature’s most deadly nano-sized insurgents”, as
described in the ABC feature story ‘Fighting the Invisible Enemy’ (Hutcheon & Palmer 2020). Military metaphors
for illness are so familiar and naturalised, it is hard to think of the current global pandemic in another way.
When an illness is seen as no mere disease but a “demonic enemy”, it becomes not just something to be treated and
tended to, but something also loaded with notions of personal responsibility and characterological assessment,
potentially guilt, shame and blame for the person who is ill. One of the main problems with militaristic and
adversarial metaphors of illness is that the demonisation of the illness too easily slides to attribution of fault on the
part of the ill person. Sontag (2009b, p. 59) finds these stigmas particularly alive in metaphors of cancer at the time
of her writing in the late 1970s. Society is engaged in the “crusade” against cancer. “Ostensibly, the illness is the
culprit. But it is also the cancer patient who is made culpable.” Militaristic and adversarial metaphors carry punitive
characterological connotations because in the structuring dichotomy of strength and weakness, those who fall
‘victim’ are somehow to blame. Something has made them personally vulnerable; perhaps they were not vigilant
enough against ‘the enemy’, perhaps they are not strong enough to fight it off. In any case, it is their own fault.
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Illness as expression of passion
Sontag notes that metaphors of illness can arise from a disease’s predominant location in the body. The epidemic of
tuberculosis in early modern Europe was predominantly pulmonary, affecting the breath and the lungs, the “upper
spiritualised body” (2009b, p. 19) considered “the lofty and noble parts of the human being”. In the nineteenth
century tuberculosis was metaphorically transposed not as a war that the body, and the body politic, waged against
an enemy, but a marker of individual refinement and sensitivity. Tuberculosis became known as a characterological
sign of “passion”, an illness “thought to come from too much passion, afflicting the reckless, the sensual” (p. 26)
that “exacerbates consciousness” (p. 36). The visible symptoms of TB, the fever and progressive emaciation,
lethargy and coughing, turn up persistently in texts as signs of the sufferer being “consumed” by their feelings. “In
TB, you are eating yourself up, being refined, getting down to the core, the real you” (p. 69).
Widespread tuberculosis in early modern Europe collided with an emerging consumer society, increased social
mobility and “important new ideas, particularly about individuality” (p. 31). At a moment when “aristocracy stops
being a matter of power and starts being mainly a matter of image”, the disease of ‘passion’ became “a new model
for aristocratic looks” (p. 29). Those famed for their sickly glamour included Italian noblewoman Princess Cristina
Trivulzio di Belgiojoso and of course the tubercular Lord Byron, the modern world’s first literary celebrity. Both
men and women in nineteenth century society styled themselves to look pale and drained, “It became rude to eat
heartily. It was glamorous to look sickly” (p. 31). Sontag finds that this visual metaphor of tubercular ‘style’ was the
“first widespread example of that distinctly modern activity, promoting the self as an image”. In the twentieth
century, metaphors attributed to tuberculosis are split between two new ‘master’ illnesses. Those which cannot be
romanticised go to cancer, while “the notion of the sufferer as a hectic, reckless creature of passionate extremes”
becomes a metaphor of madness (p. 38). The figure of the writer remains central here, as “the literary and erotic
attitudes known as ‘romantic agony’” (p. 30) become entwined with the idea that language gives access to
psychoanalytic truths. In the twentieth century, confessional writers replace tubercular aristocrats as the most
glamorous icons of suffering, embodied by pop cultural figures from Sylvia Plath to Kurt Cobain.
Joan Didion’s personal essays and public image of the 1960s overtly play on these romantic and glamourous
metaphors of mental illness. In essays that detail periods of depression and breakdown, and in the (much
reproduced) iconic portraits, Didion’s thin-armed glamour is the image of the illness as an “inner décor of the body”
(Sontag 2009b, p. 28). Many of her celebrated autobiographical essays inhabit and simultaneously take apart these
characterological metaphors of illness. Consider the scenes in which she casts herself as a depressed 28-year-old in
‘Goodbye to All That’, the personal essay about leaving New York City, from her 1968 collection Slouching
Toward Bethlehem. In this essay the young autobiographical narrator finds herself disillusioned with her glamorous
literary life. She describes feeling that “Everything that was said to me I seemed to have heard before” (Didion
2008, p. 236), and to have lost interest in “hearing about the advances other people had received from their
publishers” and “people I would like very much if only I would come out and meet them” (she adds with a suitable
feyness “I had met them already”). In a scene laden with romantic tropes of artistic poverty, she writes of moving
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into a “Monastic four-room floor-through on Seventy-fifth Street” furnished only with “a cheap double mattress”
and “two French garden chairs” (p. 232). She hangs “fifty yards of yellow theatrical silk across the bedroom
windows” but is too depressed to put weights in the corners of the curtains, and so “all that summer the long panels
of transparent golden silk would blow out the windows and get tangled and drenched in the afternoon
thunderstorms”.
In a later Didion essay, ‘In the Islands’, we find another romantic metaphor of illness first arising in the nineteenth
century: travel as a remedy. In the nineteenth century tubercular pandemic, travelling to warmer climates, or simply
out of crowded urban areas, was increasingly prescribed to wealthy sufferers. The consumptive as a “wanderer in
endless search of the healthy place” (Sontag 2009b, p. 35) became a figure of freedom and “an important model for
bohemian life”. Certain destinations took on these meanings, such as Italy and various islands in the Mediterranean,
the European alps, and the deserts of French-colonised northern Africa. Like the consumptive Keats travelling to
Rome, or the tubercular Hans going up the ‘magic mountain’ in the Swiss Alps, Didion’s essay ‘In the Islands’ finds
the depressed narrator at the grand colonial Royal Hawaiian in Honolulu. “I am sitting in a high-ceilinged room in
the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Honolulu watching the long translucent curtains billow in the trade wind and trying to
put my life back together” (Didion 2009, p. 133) (those billowing curtains seem to follow her everywhere). She’s on
the verge of divorce, in “profound emotional shock” and confused by “a world in where everything I was taught
seems beside the point”. She is too aware of the “convulsions in society”, “alienation”, “anomie” and
“assassination” that characterised 1960s USA, but it is a typically romantic image of herself to which she returns at
the centre of the essay. With a wan, slightly ironic waving away of any readerly expectation she writes:
I could indulge here in a little idle generalisation … [but] I am not the society in microcosm. I am a thirtyfour-year-old woman with long straight hair and an old bikini bathing suit and bad nerves sitting on an
island in the middle of the Pacific waiting for a tidal wave that will not come.
(p. 135)

Metaphors of illness as a critical surface
Sontag’s discourse analysis usefully identifies discursive constructions of illness, and casts into relief some of the
powerful metaphors through which we have come to understand and experience being ill. But it stops short of
offering strategies for how we might communicate, write, experience the ill self without investing in these discursive
constructions. To ‘purify’ our ill selves of metaphorical thinking, as she suggests is the “healthiest” and the “most
truthful way” (Sontag 2009b, p. 3) of being ill would also require the banishment of the metaphorical self at its
centre, the subject through which we know ourselves in language. To evoke the discourses of illness as social,
cultural and historical without penetrating the deeper discursive question of the subject’s relation to them is a
limitation of the analysis, as one contemporary critic identified. ‘Illness as Metaphor’ describes “only one layer of
the connection between our language and our world” (Mandell 1979, pp. 105–6). Mandell finds Sontag’s analysis
relies on a too-neat conflation of social history with the history of medical scientific discovery, so that as medical

214

science develops and scientific truths are established, the metaphors within social discourse also simply fall away.
This sets up a “false dichotomy” between the inherent ‘corruption’ and ‘contamination’ within language and “an
understanding of shared speech and social life that demands a perfect cleansing of all ambiguity”.
The deeper analytical insights that are missing in Sontag’s analysis are those that come from the critical lenses of
Marxist and psychoanalytic theory, the very “celebrated and influential modern doctrines” Sontag (2009a, p. 6) rails
against in her 1964 essay ‘Against Interpretation’. Sontag here objects to the practice of using Marxist and Freudian
theory to interpret art and literature, calling them “aggressive and impious theories”. “The modern style of
interpretation excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it digs ‘behind’ the text, to find a sub-text which is the true
one.” This critical methodology that would later be called “symptomatic reading” (Best & Marcus 2009, p. 3) takes
the manifest, ostensible content of the text as secondary to the meaning that can be ‘uncovered’ by its interpretation
in theory. ‘Illness as Metaphor’ is indeed not a symptomatic reading, as it views discourses of illness laterally,
across historical, literary and social texts, jumping between social history, details from nineteenth century novels,
iconic artworks, and general knowledge, to stitch together the discursive patterns. An example of the different visual
metaphors for the ill body, for instance—the tubercular is transparent, the cancerous is opaque—weaves between
details of Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain and the contemporary protocols of cancer biopsy. Where a
conventional critical study using a symptomatic method would focus only on the literary text within its own
disciplinary context, Sontag goes ‘against interpretation’, seeking not to excavate theoretical truth in one literary
text, but rather sketch its place in a broader discursive pattern of metaphor.
‘Against Interpretation’ has been cited as an early and influential statement “on the embrace of the surfaces of texts”
(Best & Marcus 2009, p. 10) as a new mode of critical reading. Applying her “quixotic, highly polemical strategy”
(Sontag 2009b, p. 99) to the discourses of illness, Sontag addresses a textual surface that in the current terminology
can be described as “surface as the location of patterns that exist within and across texts” (Best & Marcus 2009, p.
11). The intent of applying this critical method to the metaphors of illness was to “deprive something of its
meaning” (Sontag 2009b, p. 98). This we might assume means to deprive the metaphors of illness of the power of
their discursive effect. But again the verb is wrong—like Sontag’s suggestion that we “purify”, “deprive” is also
negating, and leaves the ill subject with little to work with in their living through illness or in their writing of it.
‘Loosen’ would be perhaps a more appropriate verb that invokes a more lateral, expansive movement. Here the
metaphor remains intact (as these metaphors clearly have in the 40 years since Sontag’s analysis) but is not stuck to
its ill subject or its discursive history. The loosening of the effect of these metaphors might indeed be seen as
analogous to the way meaning is framed in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), which is now commonly a part of
treatment in Western medicine for cancer and other life-changing ‘master’ illnesses. CBT addresses a person’s
conscious narratives that attach meaning to experience and asks: Is this narrative helpful? Why have I come to
understand this event, or feeling, using this narrative? Is it possible to change the narrative to something else?
Would it help to change the narrative? In the midst of treatment for breast cancer a friend told me how the metaphor
of “the new normal” was being drummed into her and her fellow patients.
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Ultimately, Sontag’s analysis does not so much “deprive” metaphors of illness of their meaning as ‘loosen’ them,
giving the ill subject a chance to put them on and take them off. In her introduction to ‘AIDS and its Metaphors’, the
companion essay to ‘Illness as Metaphor’ written twelve years later, Sontag (2009b, p. 91) retreats from the idea of
‘purifying’ illness discourses of metaphor, conceding that “of course one cannot think without metaphors”. Instead,
she offers a much more moderate idea that there are “some that we might well abstain from or try to retire”. But in
choosing not to write in the first person, Sontag avoids the most central metaphor in this pattern, that is the metaphor
of the self who is ill. ‘Illness as Metaphor’ was motivated by Sontag’s own experience of cancer, but she avoids
situating herself within it: “I did not want”, she says, “to tell yet one more story … of how someone … wept,
struggled, was comforted, suffered, took courage … though mine was also that story” (2009b, p. 98). In this way the
essay avoids the stickiest critical question. By invoking the concept of performativity here, we can situate the
autobiographical ill subject on the same critical surface of this metaphorical discourse, engaging it on similar terms,
not as truth but as a site for inhabiting these ‘characterological’ metaphors as part of performative acts of writing the
self. The performative ill subject might be “enacted and reiterated through cultural norms and discourses” (Smith &
Watson 2002 p. 214) and it is here that we might find some of the “liberating” potential that Sontag wishes for.

Performing metaphors and the ‘drama of illness’
In a personal essay published in the New York Times at the peak of the memoir ‘boom’, novelist Alice Hoffman
(2000), writing of her cancer, evokes the romantic metaphor of illness as a passion that purifies the self, and also the
ill writer as a redemptive figure with special access to the truths it uncovers. “In my experience,” she says, “ill
people become more themselves, as if once the excess was stripped away only the truest core of themselves
remained.” Asking herself “who I was at the bottom of my soul, beneath blood, skin and bones?” she decides, “More
than anything I was a writer.” By evoking the idea of performative self, it is possible to consider these kinds of
identifications revealed in the crisis of illness not as truth but as part of what Broyard (1992, p. 7) usefully calls “the
drama” of illness. Broyard was a literary critic and essayist for the New York Times. In 1989 he was diagnosed with
terminal late-stage prostate cancer. He finds “metaphor was one of my symptoms” (p. 21). His illness appeared to
him as “a visit to a disturbed country”, a “lecture I was about to give to an immense audience on a subject that had
not been specified”. Broyard’s essay ‘Intoxicated by my Illness’ describes with some humour the extreme reality
inhabited by a person who is confronted with death, or madness, or some other annihilation of the self. He describes
the “revelation” and “intoxication” and the “hot flush of ontological alertness” (p. 7) brought on by his diagnosis. Of
feeling “exalted” (p. 23) by the insights and the “unprecedented ideas and fantasies it puts in your head”. It is in this
challenged existential state that metaphors come thick and fast. Everything “comes in images now” (p. 7), Broyard
says. The balance of his life is “a beautiful paisley shawl thrown over a grand piano. Why a paisley shawl,
precisely? Why a grand piano? I have no idea”. Inhabiting these small narratives rescues Broyard from what,
quoting Ernest Becker, he calls “the suction of infinity”.
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For the subject faced with annihilation, metaphor perhaps provides something like the “provisionally stable identity”
that New Narrative writer Robert Glück (2016) speaks of in an essay reflecting on his work as part of a movement of
gay, lesbian, and working-class writers in California’s Bay Area in the 1970s and 80s. Anti-representational writing
strategies, in which the subject “rejects the confines of representation and disappears into the largest freedom of
language itself”, was a “luxurious
idealism” for the subject whose daily
reality included the violent threat of
homophobic attack and avoiding complicit
police. While immersed and versed in
Language poetry and other literary
minimalisms, The New Narrative Writers
wanted “this and more” from language.
“We did not want to break the back of
representation or to ‘punish’ it for lying,”
Glück says, “but to elaborate narration on
as many different planes as we could
which seemed consistent with the lives we
led.” What arose was “a hybrid aesthetic,

Figure 16 A screenshot of myself writing, 2015

something impure”.
Throughout this project I have consciously played with characterological metaphors of illness as part of my
autobiographical enquiries. In its early stages (about the same period that I was carrying that Leunig cartoon in my
pocket) I would use the photobooth function on my laptop to film myself in the process of writing (Figure 16). I did
this to signal my awareness of the performance of self in which I was engaged as I tried to ‘write my way out’ of
being ill. I was inhabiting a metaphor, but at the same time it retained some redemptive power for me personally and
creatively. The need to inhabit these characterological metaphors like ‘costumes’ of shared representation may be
most urgent where life is sharpest. Where survival is a daily project, a creative mind finds pleasure in it. Broyard
(1992, p. 7) perhaps says it best here: “Illness is primarily a drama, and it should be possible to enjoy it as well as to
suffer it. I see now why the Romantics were so fond of illness—the sick man sees everything as metaphor.”
Performative acts signal that “identities are not fixed or essentialized attributes of autobiographical subjects” but
rather remain provisional and are “enacted and reiterated” through discourse and actions (Smith & Watson 2002, p.
214). During this project I have also inhabited the adversarial metaphor of illness as a fight. I would coax myself to
the gym every Friday to boxing training and as I did I would compose fragments on my feet, collecting snippets of
dialogue, and details of the gym. I would ask my trainer questions, prompting descriptions about boxing which were
also a metaphor for the fight I was waging against anxiety and depression. As I trained, I wrote. As I wrote, I
became the self I was writing, and training—and back and forth it went. Performative strategies provide a way that
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the autobiographical writer might inhabit and take pleasure in metaphors of illness, while simultaneously holding a
space open for critical enquiry into their discourses. Through performative autobiographical acts we can
acknowledge how illness experience, identity and the metaphors through which we understand it, is discursive. In
the writerly play of this, there might be pleasure amid the difficulty.

218

Exit: leaving the project
This is an exit, not a conclusion. The knowledge activated in this research is not containable in the academic
convention of ‘writing-up’ and ‘concluding’ of findings. A conclusion implies that something has been drawn to a
point and closed-off, but the text, and the knowledge discovered through this practice-based research remains open,
in-process. I am reminded here, of the “dilatory” quality of the text (Barthes (1977, p.57), engendered by “serial
movement”, continuous “dislocations, overlappings, variations”. It is never concluded. As in the experience of
chronic illness that is also never concluded (cured), but which forces a transformation of ways to live with it, the
discoveries of this practice-led research have been made in the felt and qualitative relations of writing with, and
writing through. (It is a good joke to call your doctorate a chronic illness but here the metaphor is apt). This
“prepositional thinking” (Rendle-Short 2019) is a lateral move, that has taken me across the surfaces of discourse
and materialities; leaking, spreading in undisciplined ways through experimental writing modes. Writing with the
self in various states of illness and wellness, in vulnerability, in strength, as performative investigation, as creative
refusal, I have mapped an expanded field of practice, in which my writing enquiries take positions “in the interplay
of memory, experience, identity embodiment and agency” (Smith & Watson 2002, p.4). Located within this
expanded field also, are positions for the embodied, alive and enlivened voice of an academic enquiry “driven by
interest and desire” (Gibbs 2007, p.223), one that is “subject to frustration and misery as well as to productive joy
and excitement”. This voice is not fixed or static but feels more like “the liberation of symbolic energy” (Barthes
1977, p. 59) that “coincides” with the play of the text. Everything is activated—an image arises here of electricity
running through an open circuit, a few live wires are loose and sparking. So—this is not a conclusion. I will say that
I have turned over all the rocks I wished to look under for the time being (there were a lot), and I am ready to step
away, knowing the text and the expanded field of this enquiry remains open.
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